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BALLOT OR BULLET: THE IMPACT OF UK'S REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT ON PEACE AND PROSPERITY

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Abstract

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Ballot or Bullet:
The Impact of UK's Representation of the People Act on Peace and Prosperity[*]

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September 9, 2020

Abstract

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JEL classification: C33, D72, D74, N43, O17.

Keywords: Social Violence, Conflict, Riots, Democracy, Enfranchisement, Franchise Extension, Voting, Elections, Growth, Prosperity, Development.

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"This is why I say it's the ballot or the bullet. It's liberty or it's death. It's freedom for everybody or freedom for nobody." Malcolm X

"The Reform Act of 1867 was one of the decisive events, perhaps the decisive event, in modern English history. It was this act that transformed England into a democracy (…)." Gertrude Himmelfarb

1 Introduction

Democracy is under pressure around the world, with autocrats, populists, kleptocrats and left- and right-wing extremists alike stressing its deficiencies and hollowing out popular support for democratic institutions. This malaise has led The Economist to title in 2018 "After decades of triumph, democracy is losing ground".[1] Indeed, according to the 2019 annual report from Freedom House (FH (2019)) democracy has been overall on the decline for the 13th consecutive year, and currently less than half (44 percent) of countries are classified as "free", with the remainder being "partially free" (30 percent) or "unfree" (26 percent). With all the lamentation on democratic dysfunctions, one can easily forget its original "raison d'être". What are the classic virtues attributed to democracy and why does it emerge in the first place? It turns out that a crucial pilar of most theories of democracy is that democratization reduces the scope for political unrest.[2] Surprisingly, however, the existing empirical evidence on this is very lacunary at best. As detailed below, much of the existing literature on the impact of democracy on the risk of conflict typically lacks exogenous variation and can hence barely move beyond correlations at the country level that could be biased by various confounders.

Hence, empirically the democracy-conflict nexus is still an open question, and the scarcity of causal evidence on the impact of democracy on political unrest is an important shortcoming, especially in a period where democracy is under intense pressure. To address this gap in the literature, in the current paper we zoom in on a particularly decisive period of human history. Victorian England of the 19th century has been dubbed the "age of reform" and the franchise extensions put in place during this era have not only shaped modern Britain but inspired the rise of liberal democracies around the world. Among the string of reform acts stands out the so-called UK's Representation of the People Act from 1867 (also referred to as Second Reform Act), which has resulted in the largest relative surge in enfranchised voters – roughly doubling the electorate. In our current paper we study how this major reform act has affected

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[1]See The Economist (June 2018).

[2]One strand of the literature sees democracy as commitment device, with democratization leading to redistribution in favor of the population, reducing thereby reasons for revolt (see Meltzer and Richard (1981), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Fearon (2011), and Bidner et al. (2014)). In contrast, in another strand of the literature democracy reduces asymmetric information and through this channel curbs the risk of conflict (Laurent-Lucchetti et al. (2019)). This being said, both types of settings yield the prediction that democratization reduces the likelihood of conflict.

the risk of conflict. For this purpose we have built a novel panel dataset at the UK city and month level englobing new measures of social conflict, of local economic growth and of several control variables. We draw on an arguably exogenous between-city variation in the scope of enfranchisement, driven by idiosyncratic variation around the previous voting threshold of a housing rent value of ten pounds. Instrumenting the extent of franchise extension using this idiosyncratic variation (and controlling for a city's average rents and rents inequality), we are able to estimate how enfranchisement mattered for the risk of conflict. We detect a strong and significant pacifying effect of franchise extension. Quantitatively, increasing the number of electors by 89%, which is the average increase produced by the reform, reduces the conflict likelihood by almost -.093, which corresponds to a 40% of the baseline conflict risk. Expressed in standard deviations, one standard deviation change in enfranchisement (around 40% more voters) leads to a 10% standard deviations lower conflict risk.

When investigating the mechanisms at work, we find no evidence of an increase in state capacity and public spending, but we are able to show that the new voters indeed actively participated to the 1868 Elections and contributed to making UK politics more competitive. Most importantly, we also detect a strong and significant impact of franchise extension on boosting local economic growth, in particular in areas with large market potential. In terms of magnitude, increasing the number of electors by 89% (the average increase produced by the reform) leads to an increase in economic activity by around 14.6%. Expressed in standard deviations, one standard deviation change in enfranchisement (around 40% more voters) leads to a 4.7% standard deviations higher economic activity. Our findings are consistent with the notion that more inclusive, pluralistic political institutions may foster economic growth, in line with recent findings of Acemoglu et al. (2019) and Abeberesey et al. (2020), and that in turn favorable economic conditions provide fertile breading ground for peace (in line with e.g. Miguel et al. (2004); Dell et al. (2014); König et al. (2017)).

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of the existing literature, while Section 3 describes the historical context of the UK's Second Reform Act. Section 4 describes the data used, Section 5 lays out the identification strategy and Section 6 presents the baseline results. In Section 7 a series of robustness tests are carried out and Section 8 is dedidated to a discussion of the main mechanisms at work. Section 9 performs a quantification and studies counterfactual reforms, while Section 10 concludes. An extensive (Online) Appendix contains further detailed explanations and additional results.

2 Literature Review

The current paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, there exists an empirical literature at the country level linking democracy and political conflict, but this existing work

is typically not able to go beyond correlations and to exploit an arguably exogenous variation in democratization, and finds overall contradictory results. In particular, Fearon and Laitin (2003) find no significant effect of democracy, while Besley and Persson (2011a) conclude that the conflict-fuelling effect of negative shocks is muted by cohesive institutions. Several papers also find conditional or non-monotonic relationships. Hegre et al. (2001) conclude that full democracies and full dictatorships are associated with a lower conflict risk than intermediate regimes, Collier and Rohner (2008) find that democracy is linked to a lower conflict risk in rich countries while in poor countries this beneficial effect is not detected, and Cervellati and Sunde (2013) detect a peace-promoting impact of "third wave" democratization mostly when transitions were non-violent. In terms of potential pitfalls, Esteban et al. (2015) stress that while consolidated democracy may be associated with fewer mass killings, initial democratization can result in an increased risk of violence. This finding is consistent with substantial qualitative case study evidence documenting how ill-managed democratic transition can result in spikes of nationalist conflict (Snyder (2000), Mann (2005)).[3] Related to this is the literature studying episodes of (post-)electoral violence (Collier and Vicente (2014), Cederman et al. (2013), Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012)).[4]

Another relevant literature is the one studying what drives franchise extension, including namely Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby (2005), Przeworski (2009), Doepke and Tertilt (2009), Aidt and Jensen (2014), Aidt and Franck (2015). Related to this is the work theorizing why and how democracy can reduce the scope for conflict. Explanations for the democracy-peace nexus include among others the ability of the population to select tax rates and potentially redistribute (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and the literature on democracy as commitment device), the faculty of democracy to reduce asymmetric information (Laurent-Lucchetti et al. (2019)), or strengthened accountability under democracy (Collier and Rohner (2008)) – which may in turn improve state governance and boost the economy, thereby reducing grievances and increasing the opportunity cost of rebellion. On the darker end of the scale, one could also think of adverse effects of democracy, due to exacerbated electoral competition (see discussion above on the dangerous transition to democracy and on (post-)electoral violence), as well as freedom of assembly facilitating subversive activities.

In the light of these potential channels and mechanisms, it is also important to mention the

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[3]In a related manner, Fergusson et al. (2020) find that narrow elections of previously excluded left-wing parties in Colombia led to backlash from right-wing paramilitaries.

[4]Another somewhat related paper is by Fergusson and Vargas (2013) who study how the 1953 Colombian Constitution –that abolished slavery as well as literacy and wealth requirements for voting– impacted battles in the following 10 years. While their finding of a negative correlation between more new voters and conflict is interesting, it is difficult to interpret. Mechanically, if a municipality has a higher population share freed from slavery and has lower wealth and literacy, it will have more new voters. But these places may also disproportionally benefit from positive economic, political and social shocks following the abolition of slavery – the main achievement of the 1953 Constitution. Disentangling the impact of voting with respect to the much broader overall change brought by abolishing slavery is very hard.

series of papers studying other implications of franchise extension and democracy, i.e on public finances (Aidt et al. (2006), Aidt et al. (2010)), on economic growth (Acemoglu et al. (2019), Abeberesey et al. (2020)), or on health outcomes (Besley and Kudamatsu (2006), Kudamatsu (2012)). Further, the current contribution is also part of the economic history literature studying Victorian England (Aidt et al. (2010), Berlinski et al. (2011), Berlinski et al. (2014), Aidt and Franck (2015), Aidt and Franck (2019), Chapman et al. (2020)).

Last but not least, this paper is part of an emerging literature analyzing –using arguably exogenous policy variation– what actual institutions and policies are able to reduce the scope for conflict. Other contributions in this line of research have focused for example on the impact of food aid (Nunn and Qian (2014)), education (Rohner and Saia (2019)), grand coalitions (Mueller and Rohner (2018)) or reconciliation ceremonies (Cilliers et al. (2016)).

In a nutshell, the novel contribution of the current paper is two-fold: First, moving beyond correlational evidence at the country-level, it studies the impact of an arguably exogenous franchise extension on political conflict, drawing on very fine-grained conflict data that we newly constructed for this study. Second, a series of further, newly assembled data allows us to investigate the mechanisms at work, linking enfranchisement and civic peace.

3   Historical Context

The 19th century is often referred to as the British "Age of Reform" with a series of franchise extensions making politics increasingly inclusive.[5] A first milestone was the 1832 "First Reform Act" which extended the suffrage to the middle class. This reform act was motivated in part by the goal to appease (violent) popular demands for an extension of suffrage (with the 1831 "Queen Square" riots in Bristol being a famous example of such popular unrest). However, to address fears by the political elite, one clause in the electoral law was that only men owning (housing) property worth at least £10 were allowed to vote, which precluded enfranchisement by the working class.

Political protest continued and after some small reform steps the next path-breaking reform was the so-called "Second Reform Act" (known formally as the Representation of the People Act of 1867) which enfranchised part of the urban male working class in England and Wales for the first time. While introduced by the Conservative government under Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, it is widely seen as a bi-partisan bill. It received Royal Assent by the British Crown on August 15, 1867, following its passage by UK Parliament to take enactment in stages over the

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[5]The following description draws on the accounts of Himmelfarb (1966), Smellie (1968), Zimmerman (2003), Schlager (2004), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Saunders (2007), Lawrence (2009), Aidt et al. (2010), Berlinski et al. (2011), Turner and Zhan (2012), Berlinski et al. (2014), Aidt and Franck (2015), Chapman et al. (2018), Aidt and Franck (2019), Chapman et al. (2020), www.parliament.uk, the "Encyclopedia Britannica" and the "St. James Encyclopedia of Labor History Worldwide".

next couple of years, culminating in the election of 1868.

The reform bill abolished the £10 per year housing qualification for "householders" in the English and Welsh borough electorates, and granted the vote to all house owners or occupiers (tenants) in the boroughs, who have been resident during the last 12 months and paid their taxes (i.e. the so-called "poor rates").[6] While there is no clear-cut rent threshold for householders being subject to paying the poor rates tax, the typical threshold may lie somewhere around £4.[7]

This 1867 reform took place in a climate of intense debate between progressive stands that wanted to enfranchise larger parts of the population versus more conservative positions that were afraid of too radical a franchise extension, that could confer too much political power to parts of the working class that they perceived as not trustworthy, such as the Irish and strikers (Zimmerman (2003)). At the end of the day, the Representation of the People Act of 1867 ended up as one of the most decisive reforms in English history (Himmelfarb (1966)) and resulted in a path-breaking reform of the electoral system: Men in urban areas who met the property qualification were enfranchised and the reform act roughly doubled the electorate in England and Wales from one to two million men. Figure 1 shows that indeed the 1867 reform was a particularly important milestone in the history of UK electoral reform, standing out by its massive increase in the numbers of newly enfranchised voters. In our current paper we shall focus on this "Second Reform Act" of 1867 to study the effect of franchise extension on the likelihood of political unrest.

4 Data

We build a novel panel dataset at the city [Borough] and month level. The baseline monthly dataset covers 184 cities [Borough] of England and Wales over the period 1868-1869 (24 months). For robustness checks we also construct an extended dataset ranging up to the end of 1974, as well as an even more fine-grained dataset at the weekly frequency.

4.1 Conflict Data

As dependent variable of interest we will study conflict outcomes. In particular, in the baseline specifications we focus on the extensive margin of conflict events, relying on a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in a given city and month where at least one conflict event took place and 0 otherwise. In robustness checks we will also investigate the intensive margin and construct a

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[6] Note that the reform act distinguished between tenants who occupy a whole building ("householders") versus renters of a single room ("lodgers"). While the reform act did not include a rent threshold for the former, it included a rent threshold of 10 pounds for the latter (who often lived in more precarious conditions).

[7] Additional details on the rationale for using £4 as threshold for taxation (and hence voting) in the empirical analysis are provided in the Appendix A. Note that we show below in Appendix C.4 that our results are robust to using alternative thresholds.

Figure 1: Electorate Growth in British Boroughs over 19th Century

NOTE: Each column displays the average delta in the number of electors in British boroughs over different elections. Black lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. Electoral data are taken from official accounts of the parliamentary papers (House of Commons (1857), House of Commons (1866), House of Commons (1869) and House of Commons (1874)).

variable of conflict intensity at the city and month level.

To construct our novel conflict data, we start from the British newspaper archive and perform data scraping of a sample of 229,881 newspaper articles containing at least one conflict-related keyword.[8] This sample of newspaper articles stems from pieces published over our sample period by 471 national or local newspapers (out of which 425 covered at least one conflict event). Our algorithm codes as conflict observation news reports containing conflict-related keywords linked to a given city location. For illustration, the five newspapers with widest national cover of conflict events for our sample period where London Evening Standard, The Sun, The Scotsman, Morning Post and London Daily News. The full list of newspaper sources is depicted in Appendix E.[9]

4.2 Electoral Data

The main explanatory variable is the number of enfranchised citizens. The first election taking place after the passing of the Second Reform Act in 1867 is the 1868 United Kingdom general election [17 November – 7 December 1868]. Hence, we define as voting body in a given city the pre-reform number of voters until October 1868, and from November 1868 onwards, the post-reform voter numbers. The number of enfranchised electors before and after the reform are taken from official accounts of the parliamentary papers (House of Commons (1866) and House

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[8]The list of keywords used is displayed in Appendix C.21.

[9]To provide –for the purpose of illustration– a few examples of conflict-related events covered by our data, consider e.g. riots in Ashton-under-Lyne, Stalyridge, Bristol, Cardiff, Bolton, North Shields, among many others.

of Commons (1869)). Note that in a robustness analysis we move to the weekly level (Appendix C.15), which allows to take into account that the elections only started in mid-November. We have also assembled data for other elections before and after 1868 (drawing on elections 1865 and elections 1874 data from House of Commons (1857), House of Commons (1866) and House of Commons (1874)), which we use for a placebo analysis.

4.3 Instrumental Variable

As discussed in more detail below, we will instrument for the number of newly enfranchised voters after the reform by exploiting idiosyncratic variation at the city level in the structure of rents paid by householders. As argued in further detail below, when controlling for the average rents and inequality of rents, any remaining variation around the £10 threshold can be seen as quasi-exogenous. Put differently, if two cities have the same average rents and rent inequality, but one has for some reason a higher share of rents slightly below the pre-reform £10 cut-off, this city will (exogenously) experience a larger increase in new voters.

To construct this instrument and the corresponding control variables, we draw on the fine-grained rents distribution data from House of Commons (1866).

4.4 Other Data

A series of control variables are included in the baseline and robustness specifications, namely average gross estimated rents and Gini index of rents, both computed using data from House of Commons (1866), as well as population-based variables from House of Commons (1866). Further, other city-level employment-based variables (i.e. the share of population working, the share of elementary occupations, and the gender-ratio) have been constructed using the 1861 Population Census conducted by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom (IPUMS (2020)).

4.5 Descriptive Summary Statistics

The summary descriptive statistics are displayed in Appendix B, Table A1, displaying the key moments of the main variables of the analysis. Among the 4416 city-months in our sample roughly 22 percent experienced conflict. As far as the increase in the electoral base is concerned, during our period of interest of the Second Reform Act (1866 to 1869) the number of eligible voters almost doubled, while over the other periods concerned (before and after) average franchise extension was in the order of magnitude of between 3 to 27 percent. The summary statistics of various further variables reveal additional interesting patters, e.g. that public expenditures did not increase between 1868 and 1869, which is in line with the discussion of mechanisms below.

5 Identification

5.1 OLS Specification

In the goal of identifying the impact of franchise extension on social unrest, we will perform a difference-in-difference analysis. We start with the following specification for the OLS regressions:

$$Social\ Violence_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta\ Electorate_i * Post - Elections\ 1868_t + FE_i + FE_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where the variable $Social\ Violence_{it}$ is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. $\Delta\ Electorate_i$ represents the evolution in the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in city i and is computed as[10]

$$log\left(\frac{Electors\ Post-Reform}{Electors\ Pre-Reform}\right)_i$$

The variable $Post - Elections\ 1868_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868 [i.e., it equals 1 from November 1868 onwards].[11]

We include city fixed effects (which filter out time-invariant city characteristics such as e.g. elevation, sea access, longitude and latitude) and monthly time dummies (which control for country wide shocks, such as e.g. major political and economic nationwide shocks).

The variable of interest is the interaction term of $\Delta\ Electorate_i$ and $Post - Elections\ 1868_t$, and captures how big an enfranchisement the reform brought in a given city. Note that the linear impact of both components is controlled for by the fixed effects structure ($\Delta\ Electorate_i$ is filtered out by the city fixed effect, and $Post - Elections\ 1868_t$ by the month fixed effects).

The standard errors are clustered at the level of the 184 cities in all regressions (unless indicated otherwise).

5.2 Instrumentation

The above specification has the merit of filtering out time-invariant city characteristics and nationwide shocks, but one may worry that city-specific shocks and trends could confound with the coefficient of interest of franchise extension. In particular, it could be that poorer cities experience a bigger franchise extension and at the same time are catching up economically. Any pacifying effect attributed to enfranchisement could hence be spuriously driven by economic

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[10]Using the logarithm for both the $\Delta\ Electorate_i$, as well as below for the instrument, has the advantage of leading to a more compact distribution, reducing the weight of any potential outliers. In Appendix C.6 we show that the results are very similar when we do not take the logarithm.

[11]Note that our specification is equivalent to regressing $Social\ Violence_{it}$ on the *level* of $Electorate_i$, instead of $\Delta\ Electorate_i$, and controlling for past electorate numbers. This can be easily seen from the fact that $log\left(\frac{Electors\ Post-Reform}{Electors\ Pre-Reform}\right)_i$ equals $log(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ minus $log(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$.

changes.

To address such concerns, we will run two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions where we instrument for the scope of enfranchisement by exploiting idiosyncratic –arguably as good as random– variation in the number of newly-enfranchised voters for each city. As discussed above, the reform led to the removal of the previous administrative threshold of £10 rental value. If there are two cities, A and B, with exactly the same average rents and same rent inequality, but for some idiosyncratic reason in city A there is a slightly higher mass of citizens with rental value right below the previous £10 threshold, city A will, for quasi-random reasons, experience greater enfranchisement than city B. Such arguably random variation in mass around the £10 threshold – while controlling for average rents and rents variance– will be exploited by our instrumental variable strategy.

In particular, our instrumental variable (IV) is labelled "Δ *Eligible Householders*" and corresponds to the log of the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) plus the number of householders with rental value above £10 (who could already vote before the reform), divided by the latter. Formally, the IV is given by

$$log\left(\frac{Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£}{Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£}\right)_i$$

Figure 2 illustrates graphically the first stage of our 2SLS estimation. We see that our instrument "Δ *Eligible Householders*" is strongly correlated to the increase in the number of electors in a given city. The relevance of the IV will be confirmed below by formal F-Stats. Note that the raw correlation (Panel A) also holds for the residual correlation when controlling for average rents and inequality in rents (Panel B).

As far as the exclusion restriction of the IV is concerned, the instrument is valid under the assumption that the share of householders newly eligible to be enfranchised only affects the conflict risk through the increase in the electorate and not through some other channel. The plausibility of this assumption is supported by the fact that we control for both the average level of rents and for the inequality of rents. Hence, given that these controls both account for the general level of wealth, prices and inequality of a given city, the remaining variation in rents amounts to quasi-random idiosyncratic variation around the previous voting threshold of £10.

6   Main Results

Table 1 displays the main results. In column 1 we start with the OLS specification where we directly regress conflict incidence on the change in electors. Given that the enfranchisement only took effect at the 1868 general election, the change in electors is zero before this election and

Figure 2: Δ Electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act and Δ Eligible Householders

(A) Unconditional

(B) With Controls

NOTE: Panel A displays the values of (log) Δ Electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act and (log) Δ eligible householders in 184 English boroughs along two axes. Panel B displays the values of the residual of (log) Δ Electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act when control for average rents and inequality in rents and (log) Δ eligible householders in 184 English boroughs along two axes.

then post-election varies across cities. We include city fixed effects and time dummies, which makes this specification a classic difference-in-difference setting. We find a sizeable effect of enfranchisement reducing the conflict which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Quantitatively, we find that increasing the number of electors by the average increase produced by the reform (89%), reduces the conflict likelihood by almost -.093, which is a 40% of the baseline conflict risk. Expressed in terms of standard deviations, a one standard deviation change in enfranchisement (roughly 40% more voters) results in a 10% standard deviations lower conflict risk.

In column 2 we add average rents interacted with a dummy for post-election period, and in column 3 we further include the interaction of rent inequality with post-election. It turns out that the coefficient magnitude remains very stable and statistical significance high when controlling for the average and distribution of rents.

In columns 4-6 we estimate the reduced-form impact of our instrument on conflict incidence. We find that the increase in householders eligible for voting significantly reduced the conflict potential. This result holds in a specification controlling for the same batteries of fixed effects, average and inequality of rents as in the first three columns.

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Table 1: Democracy and Social Violence: Main Table

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.104***	-0.100***	-0.101***				-0.143***	-0.145***	-0.144***
	(0.0363)	(0.0380)	(0.0384)				(0.0474)	(0.0517)	(0.0513)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.123***	-0.130***	-0.130***			
				(0.0400)	(0.0447)	(0.0446)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.003	0.003	0.003
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))$, where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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Finally, in columns 7-9 we perform a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation where our IV of increase in eligible householders is in the first stage used to instrument for the increase in electors and in the second stage the estimated electors increase is used as regressor on the dependent variable of conflict incidence. We find that our instrument is a strong predictor of the change in electors (as pointed out by the F-stats substantially above the conventional threshold of 10) and that an increase in electors statistically significantly drives down the risk of conflict. Note that the coefficient size of the 2SLS estimation is of a similar order of magnitude as in the OLS estimation, and is very stable across all 2SLS results (i.e. across columns 7-9).

7 Robustness Analysis

In this section we shall briefly list the main robustness tests performed. In the interest of space, they have been relegated to the Appendix.

Additional Controls The first set of robustness checks focus on adding further control variables. In particular, for the purpose of addressing concerns on potential confounders, in Appendix C.1 a battery of additional socio-demographic control variables from the 1861 census are included, while in the Appendices C.2 and C.3, we include flexible functional form controls for the rent distribution in a given city and build alternative inequality measures, respectively. Our results prove robust to all these additional controls.

Alternative Instruments In a second set of robustness checks we investigate whether our findings are sensitive to the exact way of constructing our instrument. While in Appendix C.4 variants of the instrument are built drawing on alternative rent brackets, in Appendix C.5 another functional form of the IV is considered. Further, in Appendix C.6 we study sensitiveness with respect to an alternative way of constructing the delta of both the instrument as well as of enfranchisement. Our results remain very similar for all these specifications.

Alternative Dependent Variable To assess the scope of our findings, in Appendix C.7 we display the results for an alternative dependent variable, focusing not only on the extensive margin, but also on the intensity of conflict incidence. We find that enfranchisement does not only affect the likelihood of conflict, but also its intensity (e.g. measured by the number of conflict events).

Estimation methods and inference The next set of robustness checks investigate whether our findings hinge on the exact statistical methodology applied, or hold across a broader range of methodological approaches. Our main dependent variable being a binary 0-1 dummy, we replicate our results using logit in Appendix C.8. Next, we focus on the issue of a common pre-trend, performing first in Appendix C.9 an event-study analysis for cities with below- versus above-median enfranchisement. Going one step further, in Appendix C.10 we rely on the

Synthetic Control Method (SCM), recently applied e.g. by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), and Saia (2017), to guarantee –by construction– an identical pre-trend before the enfrachisement reform. We continue to find for these sets of methodological sensitivity checks that franchise extension has curbed conflict. Finally, in Appendix C.11 we perform alternative (two-way and spatial) clustering of standard errors, which allows to account for complex correlation patterns of standard errors. The statistical inference remains very similar.

Sample composition and units of observation In this next set of sensitivity checks we focus on robustness to the sample composition and construction of units of observation. In particular, in Appendix C.12 it is investigated whether the findings are driven by outliers. For this purpose, the regressions are re-run when cities, newspapers and random days are dropped from the sample, revealing that the results are very stable across specifications. In Appendix C.13 a longer time horizon is adopted, which highlights that the findings carry over to this longer sample. In Appendix C.14 the results are replicated over different time windows. In particular, we split our time-window into 4 sub-periods in order to assess whether enfranchisement observed in the elections correlates with differences in conflict behavior prior to the reform. Figure A7 displays the corresponding results. Reassuringly, levels of social unrest in the pre-election period do not correlate with an increase in the electorate produced by the Second Reform Act or with the rental distribution in a city. Finally, Appendix C.15 depicts the findings when the temporal unit of observation is either the week or the pre-post reform. In all cases, our results prove robust to these sensitivity tests.

Placebo analysis The next set of robustness tests address concerns about our identification strategy "mechanically" picking up something else, e.g. due to measurement error. We start off in Appendix C.16 with an assessment of whether our instrumental variable also affected conflict in other time periods, where the reform did not apply and where accordingly we would not expect any effect. We find that for both pre-post 1865 and pre-post 1874 elections, reassuringly no effects of 1868 reforms were detected. In a similar vain, in Appendix C.17 the main analysis is replicated but putting on the left-hand-side sport events instead of conflict events. As expected, the reform only affected the latter, but not the former. This attenuates concerns about reporting bias from newspaper reports affecting our results, as any mechanical bias should also affect reports on sport and not just politics. Moreover, in Appendix C.18 we randomly assign treatment in 1,000 placebo datasets with the same average conflict likelihood as the "true" data, finding reassuringly that it would be extremely unlikely that our results were found "by chance". Last but not least, in Appendix C.19 we permutate randomly the rents paid by householders to investigate the validity of our instrument. Reassuringly, no effects are found for this fake data.

Data construction Finally, we also carry out a series of robustness checks with respect to the algorithm to detect and geo-code conflict events (see Appendix C.20) and to the keywords

used (see Appendix C.21). Importantly, as major robustness check, in Appendix C.22 we also re-construct the conflict measure relying –instead of the bag-of-words approach (which could be sensitive to the exact terms included)– on machine learning techniques, using a lasso model. In particular, we hand-code 1000 strings (sentences or sentence parts) as indicating the presence of conflict or not. Of these, 900 strings are then used to train the machine learning algorithm that is next applied out-of-sample on the 100 remaining hand-coded strings (yielding an out-of-sample accuracy of 93%). We then apply this algorithm to the full set of strings of all newspaper articles to construct an alternative lasso-based dependent variable. Strikingly, the sample mean of the resulting conflict measure is extremely close to that of our baseline variable, and when replicating our baseline regressions using this very different alternative data construction approach, we find very similar results (see Appendix Table A28). In a nutshell, our baseline results prove robust to these various sensitivity tests on data construction.

8 Channels

After having scrutinized our results for a broad range of robustness checks in the previous section, we shall at present study the underlying mechanisms and channels at work. In particular, we will focus on the following three potential mechanisms through which enfranchisement could potentially drive down the risk of conflict: i) Increase in State Capacity, ii) Increased Participation in the Political Arena [Voice], and iii) Increase in economic activity. We shall assess them in turn. The main results are reported below, and supplementary robustness results on the channels and mechanisms are relegated to the Appendix D.

8.1 Increase in State Capacity

One obvious potential channel of transmission could be an increase in state capacity. As suggested by the 18th century political slogan "No taxation without representation", one may expect a quid-pro-quo with enfranchisement going along with an extension of the activities of the state. As argued among others by Fearon (2005); Collier et al. (2009); Besley and Persson (2011b), weak state capacity can be a major cause for political conflict, and hence a reason for the decline in violence after franchise extension could be greater state strength. One reason for scepticism on this potential channel is that it is well known among historians that this time period is not characterized by high levels of public spending (see Aidt et al. (2010), Chapman et al. (2018), Chapman et al. (2020)).

In what follows the increase in state capacity will be measured in two ways – by proxying it using mentions in political speeches or by focusing on proxies for public spending. First, we start by using as a proxy of state capacity the number of times cities were mentioned in political speeches held in the House of Commons and the House of Lords (UK Parliament (2018)). The

results are displayed in Table 2. Our explanatory variable of interest is the increase in people eligible for voting (labelled "electors"), and we measure city prominence relying on the log of city mentions. The points estimates are close to zero, suggesting no effect of the reform on this proxy of state capacity. These null results carry over to the Appendix Table A32 (using a Poisson model).

Table 2: Channels: Democracy and State Capacity - Political Speeches

Dep. Var.: (log) City Mentions in Pol. Speeches $_{iv}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	0.0200	0.00348	0.00938				0.0534	0.0283	0.0246
	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.149)				(0.181)	(0.211)	(0.212)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$				0.0468	0.0256	0.0224			
				(0.159)	(0.191)	(0.193)			
Observations	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472	1,472
R-squared	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704	0.704			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	267	218	206
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229	1.229

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and time v. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is the (log +1) number of mentions of city i and time/volume v. It was obtained using the Hansard Archive of Digitized Debates that contains digitized plain-text transcriptions of all debates for the House of Commons and House of Lords. Hansard data is available in volumes that cover a period of around three months. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_v$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

As second proxy for state capacity, we use public expenditure in the city for years 1868 and 1869 [pre-post elections], using data from Knatchbull-Hugessen (1869) and Knatchbull-Hugessen (1870). This data is only available at the yearly level, which considerably restricts the statistical analysis. The results are displayed in Table 3. Again, the estimates suggest also no effect of the reform on this second proxy of state capacity. Similar results are displayed in Appendix Table A33 where we draw on data on the deficit at the municipal level. As previously, we do not detect any effect of enfranchisement.

It is important to interpret these findings with caution. First of all, our proxies for state capacity are quite rough, which could result in measurement error and attenuation bias. Second, we focus on the impact of *sharp* changes in the electorate on *sharp*, short-run changes in state capacity. If building up a powerful state apparatus and enacting public spending takes many years, our identification strategy may miss out on such medium- and long-run effects. This may, for example, apply to educational spending and school construction, which may deplete effects only several years down the road.

Table 3: Channels: Democracy and State Capacity - Public Expenditure

Dep. Variable: (log) Public Expenditure$_{i,1869}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$	0.483	0.00908	0.0155	0.725	-0.0483	-0.0685
	(0.379)	(0.0713)	(0.0752)	(0.494)	(0.0757)	(0.102)
Observations	141	136	136	141	136	136
R-squared	0.012	0.963	0.963	0.009	0.963	0.963
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	130	124	115
(log) Public Expenditure$_{i,1868}$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i in year 1869. The full sample covers 141 cities. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-3 [4-6]. The dependent variable is the (log) public expenditure in the city in 1869 (Knatchbull-Hugessen (1870)). The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The instrumental variable used in columns 4-6 is Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

8.2 Increased Participation in the Political Arena

Another mechanism through which enfranchisement could deploy effects on conflict outcomes is a higher accountability of the state, as greater political participation and inclusion may result in larger scrutiny. The key role of state accountability for reducing fighting has been stressed among others in Collier and Rohner (2008). Obviously, one pre-condition for this channel is that the newly enfranchised voters actually made use of their new-found powers and went voting, thereby increasing political openness and competition. In Table 4 we investigate this, running the following specification:

$$\Delta\ Voters_{1868-1865,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta\ Electors_{1868-1865,i} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{2}$$

We find that indeed cities with more new electors eligible for voting saw a larger increase in the number of voters participating to the November 1868 elections. For more voters to trigger greater political accountability, a key question is if these influx of new political actors has made the political arena more competitive. It turns out that this has been the case. As documented in Figure 3, in the elections of 1868 there has indeed been an increase in political competition, reflected by an increase in the number of contested elections.

One remaining question is whether the new voters did not only participate to elections and increased the competitiveness of UK politics, but on top of that were more active than previously-enfranchised citizens, thereby pushing upward the whole overall turnout. As reported in Appendix

Table 4: Channels - Democracy Participation in the Political Arena - Δ Voters

Dep. Variable: Δ Voters$_i$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$	1.102***	1.043***			1.226***	1.180***
	(0.105)	(0.0722)			(0.194)	(0.178)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$			0.851***	0.826***		
			(0.152)	(0.149)		
Observations	108	108	108	108	108	108
R-squared	0.557	0.573	0.341	0.379	0.550	0.565
1st stage F-Stat Delta Electors	-	-	-	-	87	57
Average Rents$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-4 [5-6]. The dependent variable is the Δ Voters$_i$ computed as $log((Voters\ Elections - 1868)/(Voters\ Elections - 1865))_i$ where $(Electors\ Elections - 1868)_i$ and $(Electors\ Elections - 1865)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The instrumental variable used in columns 5-6 is Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ which is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. Average gross estimated rents and Gini index of rents are both computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 3: Share Contested Election 1865-1868

NOTE: The two bars indicate the share of borough with contested elections in the elections of 1865 and 1868, respectively. Election data is obtained from House of Commons (1866) and House of Commons (1869).

Table A34, the results on this are not very conclusive. There appears to be a slight positive effect of enfranchisement to increase the overall turnout, but it is only borderline statistically significant in some of the specifications.

8.3 Increase in economic activity

A third and final channel that we investigate is that enfranchisement could have boosted economic activity and favorable economic conditions provided a fertile breading ground for peace. In particular, more inclusive, pluralistic political institutions may create the conditions for more inclusive economic institutions and greater and more sustained economic growth (see Acemoglu et al. (2019) and Abeberesey et al. (2020), which suggest that democracy does favor economic growth). In turn, various papers (see e.g. Miguel et al. (2004); Dell et al. (2014); König et al. (2017)) have found that peace is more easily achieved under favorable economic conditions.

In our analysis, we use as a proxy of economic activity the number of times cities were mentioned in job advertisements in newspapers.[12] The results are displayed in Table 5. Throughout all specifications it is found that greater enfranchisement has resulted in an increase in our proxy of economic growth. The effect is quantitatively substantial: Increasing the number of eligible electors by 89% (i.e. the average increase triggered by the reform), leads to a rise in economic activity by around 14.6%. Expressed in terms of standard deviations, a one standard deviation increase in enfranchisement (around 40% more voters) leads to a 4.7% standard deviations greater economic activity.

These findings of a strong positive effect of the reform on economic activity carry over to an alternative specification using a Poisson model (see Appendix Table A36).

8.4 Heterogeneous Effects

In the goal of further substantiating the notion that the Second Reform Act succeeded in attenuating social tensions by fostering economic opportunities, we study heterogeneous effects of the above results, when distinguishing between areas with much versus little economic potential. In the interest of space, all detailed information on the exact specification and all tables have been relegated to Appendix D.4. We find a set of interesting results: It is shown that both the pacifying and growth-promoting effects of enfranchisement are magnified in towns that have a high market potential (i.e. that are located close to large numbers of potential consumers). This is consistent with the notion that indeed the growth-promoting effect of democratization is one of the prime mechanisms at work that can explain the drop in violence after the Second Reform Act.

A further heterogeneous effect makes use of detailed information on the demographic composition of the population. As discussed in depth in Appendix D.5, one dimension of social tensions in the 1860s were conflicts between the Anglican population and Catholic immigrant workers from

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[12]We identify pages of job advertisements as those pages classified as advertisement which contain the word "Wanted".

Table 5: Channels: Democracy and Economic Growth - Newspaper Ads

Dep. Var.: (log) City Mentions in Newsp. Ads$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	0.164**	0.156**	0.175**				0.228***	0.230**	0.218**
	(0.0681)	(0.0729)	(0.0705)				(0.0797)	(0.0919)	(0.0889)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				0.198***	0.206**	0.196**			
				(0.0700)	(0.0825)	(0.0796)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.935	0.935	0.936	0.935	0.935	0.936			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679	3.679

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is (log+1) of number of mentions of city i in pages of job advertisements in month t using national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Ireland, giving rise e.g. to the so-called "Murphy riots" (Arnstein (1975)). We expect greater inter-group tensions in towns with a greater level of ethnic polarization (i.e. with a few large groups facing each other; e.g. in a city with close to half of the population being English and the other half Irish). This is indeed what we detect in Appendix D.5 (which also contains all methodological details and exact variable definitions). These findings are in line with the notion that in areas with higher initial social tensions political reform has a greater pacifying potential.

Finally, we investigate in Appendix D.6 what types of social violence are affected by enfranchisement. As explained in details in Appendix D.6, we expect an (almost mechanical) decrease in *political* violence linked to claims for representation (as the enfranchisement has addressed various points of pre-reform demands), and also a reduction in *ethno-religious* violence due to a better representation of all major ethnic groups in society. Finally, given the growth-promoting effect of the reform (see Section 8.3), one may expect a higher opportunity cost of social unrest, which could attenuate the risk of all types of conflict – not only the two aforementioned ones, but also others, such as *economic* types of social conflict. The Tables A40, A41 and A42 in Appendix D.6 find indeed that franchise extension tends to reduce all these three types of social conflict.

9   Quantification and Counterfactual Reforms

Using the coefficient reported in Column (4) of Table 1, we investigate the potential effect of alternative electoral reforms. Namely, we study the effect of reducing or increasing the £10 thresholds using the number of lodgers in different rent-brackets. The results are displayed in Panel A of Figure 4. The red bar indicates the effect obtained with the actual reform. Darker bars depict the impacts of different, *counter-factual* reforms applying alternative rental thresholds for householders [the darker the bar, the lower the threshold]. For example: if the reform allowed all householders who paid rent (regardless of the rental value) to vote, the corresponding reduction of social violence would be of around 48% [-.1115] (rather than 40 % [-.0931] obtained with the actual reform) [note that the sample mean of social violence over the sample period was 0.2305]. If, in contrast, the reform increased the minimum rental value to 20 £, the likelihood of observing social violence would be 30 % higher, aggravating the level of social conflict and political violence in the United Kingdom.

In terms of economic activity, as depicted in Panel B of Figure 4, if the reform were to enfranchise all householders who paid rent (regardless of the rental value), the corresponding increase in economic activity would *ceteris paribus* have been of around 17.5% [instead of 14.6%] If, in contrast, the reform had increased the minimum rental value to 20 [15]£, there would have been a contraction in economic activity of around 10.7 % [5.85 %].

Beyond the aforementioned, general quantification, one can also consider actual competing policies that were "on the table" during the parliamentary debate and that typically aimed at limiting the scope of franchise extension. As pointed out by Zimmerman (2003), "*many Liberal MPs were convinced that a significant section of the middle classes - and in particular the most prosperous part - shared their anxieties. Many such people feared that a wider franchise would give too much political power to what they perceived as dubious elements among the working classes such as the Irish and strikers. The Whig Sir Richard Bethell reportedly claimed that his constituents at Wolverhampton were concerned that a six-pound franchise 'would let in several Thousand more, and of a low Class, including a large Proportion of Irish, dwarfing the respectable Part of the Constituency'*" (p. 1186). In particular, we can assess the impact of a counter-factual 6-pound franchise that was originally the goal of the Select Committee of the House of Lords formed in 1860 (House of Commons (1860)): If the reform had allowed only householders who paid 6 £ rent to vote, the corresponding reduction in social violence would have been of around 25.98% [-.0599] (rather than 40 % [-.0931] obtained with the actual reform), and economic growth would have increased by 9.39% (instead of 14.6%).

Figure 4: Estimated Effect of Reform and Counterfactual Reforms

(A) Social Violence   (B) Economic Activity

NOTE: Panel A [B] displays the estimated effect of the Second Reform Act and the potential effect of alternative electoral reforms on social violence [economic activity]. Estimates are obtained using the coefficient reported in Column (4) of Table 1. The red bar indicates the effect obtained with the actual reform. The other bars depict the impacts of different, *counter-factual* reforms applying alternative rental thresholds for householders [the darker the bar, the lower the threshold].

10   Conclusion

In the present contribution we have examined the impact of enfranchisement on peace and prosperity, drawing on a milestone electoral reform during the UK's Victorian epoch, the Representation of the People Act of 1867. We have built from scratch a novel panel dataset at the city and month level for the period around the reform, collecting novel data on social conflict, local economic growth and a battery of controls. Exploiting an arguably exogenous variation in the extent of enfranchisement across UK cities, we identify a strong and significant pacifying effect of franchise extension. While there is some indication that one relevant channel of transmission is a surge in the competitiveness of UK politics, we find strong evidence that a major mechanism at work is that of democratization boosting local economic growth.

On a more general level, our findings support the notion that civil peace and economic development are inter-twined issues and that it is hard to reach one goal while failing on the other. This point of inter-dependence has been recently stressed by Rohner and Thoenig (2020) who talk about a *macro-complementarity* between promoting peace and fostering development. Our current paper highlights the complementary effect of a *political* reform not only achieving the *political* goal of reducing unrest, but on top of that boosting local *economic* growth. These complementarities of peace and prosperity call for an integrated approach of tackling unrest and under-development *at the same time*, rather than leaving these inter-linked problems to two distinct policy communities. Further research on this, as well as an in-depth analysis of the effects of specific institutional rules, is strongly encouraged.

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ONLINE APPENDIX

Ballot or Bullet:

The Impact of UK's Representation of the

People Act on Peace and Prosperity

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In the Online Appendices below we provide additional description, investigation and further results for the various sections of the paper. We shall first provide additional information on the historical context and data, before providing a series of further robustness checks.

Below is listed the Table of Content of the Online Appendices.

A Appendix: Historical Context

In what follows we shall provide additional details on particular aspects of the historical context and how we take this into account in the variable construction.

An important aspect is that –as discussed above– householders are only enfranchised when paying taxes (i.e. the so-called "poor rates"). Only citizens with some minimum level of income are subject to taxation, and a key question is how this minimum taxation affluence level translates into the average house value of a given householder. In our baseline analysis we set this threshold at 4 £annual rental value, hence presuming that citizens living in below-threshold housing typically do not pay the poor rates taxes (and hence are not enfranchised) while those living in houses with value above the threshold do pay taxes (and are enfranchised by the Second Reform Act). Importantly, in robustness checks below we show that our results are not sensitive to the exact threshold level.

Having as threshold the 4 £ rental value is reasonable. The Law Times [July 4, 1868][1] provided a table showing the additions to be made to the numbers of the borough electors by the new householder franchise: *"We have taken the trouble to analyse the poor-rate returns of all the boroughs, for the purpose of ascertaining the probable numbers which household suffrage will add to each of them."* While setting a threshold of rental value at 0 pounds would lead to overstating the number of new electors by almost half, setting a threshold of 4 leads to a number of estimated new voters very close to the actual numbers.[2]

This is also consistent with a Return to an Address of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated 17 May 1860, which showed for every parliamentary city and borough in England and Wales the number of persons rated as occupiers to the Relief of the Poor in 1853, and where the lowest threshold displayed in the table was 4 £. This clearly shows that below 4 pounds citizens were very unlikely to pay taxes.

Finally, in line with this, the Report of the select committee appointed to inquire what would be the probable increase of the number of electors in the counties and boroughs of England and Wales from a reduction of the franchise [1860] stated: *"Question - Then, in order to make this return accurate, as an estimate of the effect of the proposed change, it is necessary to add all the occupiers of houses put down in your rate book at a gross estimated rented of 6 £ or 4 £?"* *"Answer - Yes, 4 £ and above."* [House of Commons (1860), Page 53].

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[1]The Law Times was a periodical, published from 1843 to 1965. It contained, among other things, information on all the cases treated and decided in the House of Lords.

[2]The average percentage difference between the full set of householders below 10 pounds and the probable addition of electors reported in the Law Times is of around 42%, whereas the average percentage difference between the full set of householders above 4 pounds and below 10 pounds and the probable addition of electors reported in the Law Times is only of around 8%.

B Appendix: Data

Below in Table A1 the summary descriptive statistics are displayed. As discussed in the main text above in Section 4.5, about 22 percent of observations experienced conflict and the period of interest in the current study (1866 to 1869) displayed a much larger increase in electors than any of the other periods before or after.

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Social Violence$_{it}$	0.223	0.416	0	1	4,416
Δ *Electorate 1869 - 1866$_i$*	0.892	0.403	-0.047	2.352	184
Δ *Electorate 1873 - 1869$_i$*	0.071	0.291	-2.61	1.062	180
Δ *Electorate 1866 - 1860$_i$*	0.092	0.135	-0.379	0.570	184
Δ *Electorate 1860 - 1857$_i$*	0.029	0.081	-0.257	0.276	182
Δ *Electorate 1857 - 1832$_i$*	0.267	0.445	-0.822	2.988	182
Δ *Eligible Householders in 1866$_i$*	0.823	0.354	0.01	1.899	184
Δ *Eligible Householders in 1866 [Full Distr.]$_i$*	1.021	0.422	0.01	2.215	184
Δ *Eligible Householders in 1853$_i$*	0.771	0.315	0.038	1.698	184
Average Rents$_i$	26.587	17.262	1.445	184.89	184
Rent Inequality$_i$	0.494	0.071	0.238	0.641	184
(log) City Mentions in Political Speeches +1$_{iv}$	1.229	1.236	0	6.052	1,472
(log) Public Expenditure in 1869$_i$	8.236	1.679	3.466	12.849	141
(log) Public Expenditure in 1868$_i$	8.25	1.701	3.466	13.264	136
Δ *Turnout 1868-1865$_i$*	0.7876	0.525	-1.926	1.818	108
(log) City Mentions in Newspaper Ads +1$_{it}$	3.679	1.386	0	8.09	4,416

NOTE: For sources and details see Section 4.

C Appendix: Robustness Analysis

C.1 Additional Socio-Demographic Controls

In what follows we investigate how sensitive the baseline findings are with respect to controlling for potential confounders. In particular, in Table A2 we explore whether our results hold when we include additional controls (obtained from the Census of 1861 (IPUMS (2020)). We find that controlling for a series of socio-demographic factors does not substantially affect our findings.

Table A2: Democracy and Social Violence - Additional Socio-Demographic Controls

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Panel A: OLS Results								
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.104***	-0.100***	-0.105***	-0.0817**	-0.0996***	-0.0982***	-0.103***	-0.112***	-0.0824**
	(0.0363)	(0.0380)	(0.0374)	(0.0370)	(0.0361)	(0.0358)	(0.0359)	(0.0373)	(0.0406)
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.371	0.371	0.371	0.370	0.370	0.372
	Panel B: Two-Stage Least Square Results								
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.143***	-0.145***	-0.144***	-0.120**	-0.135***	-0.130***	-0.142***	-0.155***	-0.122**
	(0.0474)	(0.0517)	(0.0486)	(0.0524)	(0.0466)	(0.0464)	(0.0473)	(0.0490)	(0.0581)
1st stage F-Stat	232	195	197	157	229	233	249	244	123
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Share Population Working$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Share Workers in Elementary Occupations$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ 68	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Sex Ratio$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
(log) Population in 1866$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ 8	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Δ Population 1866-1861$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$8	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM [2SLS] estimates are reported in Panel A [B]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.2 Including Flexible Rent-Based Controls

Our baseline specifications control for the interactions of the "post-election 1868" dummy with average rents and rent inequality variables. As discussed in Section 7, we below conduct a sensitivity test where we include flexible versions of the rent-based controls. Column 1 of Table A3 displays our baseline OLS results. Column 2 depicts the result obtained when we allow the linear effect of rent-based variables to vary at the yearly level (instead of pre-post periods). Columns 3 includes month-quartile average and Gini rent specific FEs. The results are robust, independently of the structure of rent-based controls we add.

Table A3: Democracy and Social Violence - Flexible Rent-Based Controls

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.101***	-0.101***	-0.0894**				-0.144***	-0.144***	-0.133**
	(0.0384)	(0.0386)	(0.0428)				(0.0513)	(0.0516)	(0.0557)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.114**			
				(0.0446)	(0.0448)	(0.0462)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.376	0.396	0.370	0.376	0.396			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	186	184	150
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Average Rents$_i$ * Year$_y$	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Year$_y$	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Quartile Average Rents-Time FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Quartile Rent Inequality-Time FEs	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM [2SLS] estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 Using Alternative Inequality Measures

In the current Appendix Section, we construct a city-level Gini rent inequality index from bined rent categories data using the robust Pareto midpoint estimator proposed by von Hippel et al. (2016) and Von Hippel et al. (2017). We replicate the baseline regressions when using such alternative inequality measures. While column 1 reproduces for comparison the baseline results of columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 1, in columns 2 and 3 of Table A4 below we run a variant of our baseline regressions. In particular, we explore whether our results are affected by using *Mehran* and *Piesch indexes* of inequality. Similarly, columns 4 and 5 show the results obtained using the *Kakwani* and *Theil indexes*. Finally, in the last two columns we use as measures of rent inequality a *Generalized Entropy Index* and the *Mean-Log Deviation* of rents observed in the city. It turns out that our results are virtually unchanged when controlling for these alternative inequality measures.

Table A4: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Inequality Indexes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Panel A: OLS Results			
Δ *Electorate$_i$* * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	-0.101***	-0.0995***	-0.101**	-0.101**	-0.0989**	-0.100***	-0.101**
	(0.0384)	(0.0376)	(0.0390)	(0.0390)	(0.0401)	(0.0380)	(0.0387)
				Panel B: Reduced Form Results			
Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* £10	-0.130***	-0.130***	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.126***	-0.132***	-0.130***
	(0.0446)	(0.0445)	(0.0449)	(0.0448)	(0.0454)	(0.0448)	(0.0447)
				Panel C: Two-Stage Least Square Results			
Δ *Electorate$_i$* * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	-0.144***	-0.143***	-0.145***	-0.145***	-0.147***	-0.144***	-0.144***
	(0.0513)	(0.0506)	(0.0525)	(0.0523)	(0.0552)	(0.0504)	(0.0515)
1st stage F-Stat	186	201	172	174	149	197	183
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mehran Index Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Piesch Index Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Kakwani Index Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Theil Index Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Generalized Entropy Measure Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Mean Log Deviation Rents$_i$ * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$*	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM [2SLS] estimates are reported in Panels A and B [Panel C]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. Average gross estimated rents and Gini index of rents, both computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Additional controls have been constructed using the 1861 Population Census conducted by the Secretary of State of the United Kingdom (IPUMS (2020)). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.4 Exploiting Alternative Rental Brackets

In this Appendix Section we investigate the robustness to computing alternative instruments when applying other rental brackets. Columns 1 and 2 of Table A5 reproduce –for the sake of comparison– the baseline results of Table 1, while in columns 3 and 4 instead of the usual rental value threshold of 4 £, a threshold of 5 £is used, and hence the instrument becomes as follows:

$$log\left(\frac{Number\ Lodgers\ 5-10£+Number\ Lodgers\ Above\ 10£}{Number\ Lodgers\ Above\ 10£}\right)_i$$

The following columns use instruments constructed analogously, but applying even higher thresholds. In the light of the above discussion in Appendix Section A, such higher thresholds are less reasonable than our baseline choice of 4 £, but it is still useful to investigate how stable results are over a range of alternative thresholds. It turns out that the results remain statistically significant and quantitatively robust up to a threshold of 7 pounds, and become less precisely estimated in columns 9-10 with a threshold of 8 pounds, which is unsurprising as it removes over 80 percent of the variation in the instrument (i.e. only 18 percent of the baseline enfranchisement is picked up by this very coarse measure).

Table A5: Democracy and Social Violence - Exploiting Alternative Rental Brackets [1]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.151***	-0.160***	-0.162**	-0.163**	-0.194**	-0.203**	-0.108	-0.0872
	(0.0474)	(0.0513)	(0.0540)	(0.0511)	(0.0670)	(0.0712)	(0.0876)	(0.0984)	(0.0970)	(0.120)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
1st stage F-Stat	232	186	152	131	74	73	36	36	24	17
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IV Computed using rent brackets	4 £ - Over		5 £ - Over		6 £ - Over		7 £ - Over		8 £ - Over	
Share of baseline distribution of rental	1		.746		.514		.314		.177	

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. 2SLS estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The instrument used in the table is Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* and it is computed using different thresholds of rent distribution in a given city. Results displayed in columns 1-2 (3-4) [5-6] are obtained using the number of householders rental value between 4 (5) [6] £and above. Results displayed in columns 7-8 (9-10) are obtained using the number of householders rental value between 7 (8) £and above. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A6 below carries out an analogous analysis, but also modifies the upper limit of the bracket of housing rent value. In particular, in columns 2 and 3 the instrument is computed as

$$log\left(\frac{Number\ Lodgers\ 5-10£+Number\ Lodgers\ Above\ 15£}{Number\ Lodgers\ Above\ 15£}\right)_i$$

and in the following columns narrower rent brackets are considered. We again find the baseline results to be stable over a substantial range of possible rent brackets used as instruments (with, again, weaker results for the last two columns where, again, less than 20 percent of the initial

variation is used).

Table A6: Democracy and Social Violence - Exploiting Alternative Rental Brackets [2]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.150***	-0.160***	-0.161**	-0.164**	-0.185**	-0.191**	-0.0844	-0.0736
	(0.0474)	(0.0513)	(0.0539)	(0.0542)	(0.0668)	(0.0746)	(0.0842)	(0.0950)	(0.121)	(0.135)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
1st stage F-Stat	232	186	127	91	57	40	39	35	10	9
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IV Computed using rent brackets	4 £ - Over		5 £ - 15 £		6 £ - 14 £		7 £ - 13 £		8 £ - 12 £	
Share of baseline distribution of rental	1		.562		.410		.286		.179	

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. 2SLS estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The instrument used in the table is Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* and it is computed using different thresholds of rent distribution in a given city. Results displayed in columns 1-2 (3-4) [5-6] are obtained using the number of householders rental value between 4 £ and above (5 to 15 £) [6 to 14 £]. Results displayed in columns 7-8 (9-10) are obtained using the number of householders rental value between 7 £ to 13 £ (8 to 12 £). City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.5 Alternative Instruments

Like in the previous Appendix Section, we assess here the instrument sensitivity, but focusing this time not on rent bracket limits, but on functional forms. In particular, Table A7 displays the results.

Columns 1 and 2 reproduce the baseline OLS results of Table 1, in the goal of providing for illustration a quantitative benchmark. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 reproduce our baseline 2SLS results from Table 1. In contrast, the results in columns 5-6 are obtained when using as alternative instrument

$$log\big(\tfrac{Number\ Householders\ 0-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds}{Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds}\big)_i$$

The results for this alternative instrument (which assumes that after the reform all householders can vote) are very similar to those for the baseline instrument (which accounts for the evidence that after the reform typically only householders occupying property of rental value above 4 £can vote). This is reassuring, as it suggests that our results are not sensitive to the threshold of 4 £. Finally, in columns 7-8 of Table A7 the instrument is again computed as in our baseline specification of Table 1 but using rental value statistics of 1853 instead of 1866. The similarity of results highlights that the distribution of rents has remained fairly stable over time.

Table A7: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Instruments

Dep. Variable: (log) Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.104***	-0.101***	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.132***	-0.134***	-0.141**	-0.136*
	(0.0363)	(0.0384)	(0.0474)	(0.0513)	(0.0436)	(0.0487)	(0.0661)	(0.0729)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370						
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	232	186	237	211	75	50
Instrumental Variable		-	4 £ - Over in 1866		All rents in 1866		4 £ - Over in 1853	
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-2 (3-8). The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. Results displayed in columns 3-4 are obtained using as instrument the variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i in 1866 , respectively. Results in columns 4-5 are obtained using as instrument the variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* computed using the full distribution of rents in the city. The last two columns displays estimates obtained using as instrumental the variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* calculated using the 4 £ and above rent distribution observed in 1853. Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.6 Alternative Delta

In this Appendix Section we assess the robustness to an alternative way of computing the delta – both for the instrument, as for the extent of enfranchisement. In particular, Table A8 is obtained using the delta formulas of, respectively:

$$\frac{Electors\ Post-Reform - Electors\ Pre-Reform}{Electors\ Pre-Reform} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds}{Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds}_i$$

As shown in Table A8, the results are remain very similar for this variant.

Table A8: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Deltas

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0343**	-0.0327**	-0.0328**				-0.0466***	-0.0451**	-0.0457**
	(0.0140)	(0.0143)	(0.0142)				(0.0177)	(0.0187)	(0.0182)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.0510***	-0.0509***	-0.0528***			
				(0.0169)	(0.0182)	(0.0182)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.371	0.371	0.371			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	99	85	90
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as [*Electors Post − Reform$_i$ − (Electors Pre − Reform$_i$)]/(Electors Pre − Reform$_i$)* where (*Electors Post − Reform*)$_i$ and (*Electors Pre − Reform*)$_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_v$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as (*Number Householders 4 − 10£ + Number Householders Above 10£*)/(*Number Householders Above 10£*)$_i$, where (*Number Householders 4 − 10£*)$_i$ and (*Number Householders Above 10£*)$_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.7 Alternative Dependent Variables

We explore below the relationship between electors and violence looking at the number of events in a month. In particular, we use as dependent variable the (log) number of events in a month (Table A9) and the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (Table A10), respectively. Further, we run a Poisson regression in Table A11. In all cases our results remain statistically significant over all specifications.

Table A9: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Dependent Variable - Intensive Margin [1]

Dep. Variable: (log) Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.218***	-0.231***	-0.234***				-0.261**	-0.301**	-0.299**
	(0.0830)	(0.0860)	(0.0889)				(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.124)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.226**	-0.270**	-0.269**			
				(0.100)	(0.113)	(0.111)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.483	0.483	0.484	0.483	0.483	0.483			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.311	.311	.311	.311	.311	.311	.311	.311	.311

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is the (log+1) number of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Dependent Variable - Intensive Margin [2]

Dep. Variable: IHS Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.261***	-0.276***	-0.280***				-0.313**	-0.359**	-0.356**
	(0.0978)	(0.101)	(0.105)				(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.145)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.271**	-0.322**	-0.321**			
				(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.129)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.490	0.490	0.491	0.490	0.490	0.490			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.39	.39	.39	.39	.39	.39	.39	.39	.39

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A11: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Dependent Variable - Intensive Margin [3]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence Events$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-1.156**	-1.419**	-1.605***			
	(0.538)	(0.621)	(0.490)			
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-1.104*	-1.562**	-1.916***
				(0.619)	(0.794)	(0.639)
Observations	3,744	3,744	3,744	3,744	3,744	3,744
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	2.296	2.296	2.296	2.296	2.296	2.296

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. Poisson estimates are reported in columns 1-6. The dependent variable is the number of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.8 Logit

As discussed in Section 7, in the Table A12 below we replicate our main baseline specifications using conditional logit regressions instead of the linear probability model that we have used throughout the paper. Like for the baseline analysis, we continue to find a statistically significant conflict-reducing effect of franchise extension.

Table A12: Democracy and Social Violence - Fixed Effect Logit Estimator

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.836***	-0.761***	-0.768***			
	(0.269)	(0.291)	(0.292)			
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.964***	-0.990***	-0.985***
				(0.300)	(0.368)	(0.366)
Observations	3,648	3,648	3,648	3,648	3,648	3,648
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. Fixed effects logit estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is the number of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.9 Intensity of Enfranchisement and Evolution of Social Violence

As a first way of tackling the issue of a common pre-trend, in the current Appendix Section we study graphically the evolution of both low versus high enfranchisement cities. In particular, in the spirit of an event study, we compare in Figure A1 below the evolution of social violence for below-median enfranchisement cities (in red) versus cities with above-median franchise extension (blue line). We find that before the election the level of social violence in the two types of cities moved largely in parallel, whereas post-reform the more enfranchised cities displayed on average a lower level of social violence.

Figure A1: Intensity of Δ Electorate and Social Violence

NOTE: The figure displays the evolution of social violence in low intensity (red line) and high intensity (blue line) municipalities. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. Low (high) boroughs are defined as all municipalities where the increase in electorate is below the median (above the median). The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1.

C.10 Synthetic Control Method

As a next step for addressing worries about common pre-trends in high versus low enfranchisement cities, in the current Appendix Section we present results using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM). This constitutes a transparent method of choosing counterfactual units, and has recently been applied e.g. in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Billmeier and Nannicini (2013).

In our setting, we define treated and potential counterfactual units based on the intensity of the treatment. That is, the potential control units for a given city are all cities where the enfranchisement brought by the Second Reform Act was lower than for the unit of interest.[3]

For each city, we apply the synthetic algorithm to construct a counterfactual unit as a weighted combination of a group of potential counterfactual units. Weights are selected in order to approximate the incidence of conflict events of the unit in question prior to reform, using a transparent data-driven procedure. To ensure that the results are not driven by the inclusion of any particular district and to assess statistical significance of our estimates, we replicate this procedure using 500 different groups of potential counterfactuals, where each counterfactual group is computed randomly by drawing on two-thirds of all control districts.[4]

In order to assess the total effect of the reform at the aggregate level we combine all *treated* cities and the corresponding synthetic counterfactual observations. In doing so, we are able to compare the actual incidence of social violence observed in the United Kingdom with the distribution of violence observed in the 500 aggregate synthetic counterfactual units.

Panel A in Figure A2 displays the results obtained using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM). We can see that the treated group (with high enfranchisement, represented by the slim solid line) follows –by construction– an extremely similar path before the electoral reform, but thereafter displays systematically lower levels of conflict. Similar findings are obtained when we use as *treatment variable of interest* our instrumental variable (Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$*) [Panel B of Figure A2].

To rule out that this result is obtained "by chance" or due to some "mechanical" measurement error, we perform a placebo SCM analysis on other election years where no large-scale franchise extension occurred and where accordingly we do not expect any effects. The results are displayed in Figure A3, where, as expected, we do not perceive any systematic differences between the treatment and control group after these "placebo" elections.

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[3]We implement the synthetic control method for all districts where the delta in the number of electors is above the 25*th* percentile. This is due to the fact that the synthetic algorithm requires a certain number of potential counterfactual units. To allow a meaningful difference between treated and controls units, we select as potential counterfactual units only those with a value of Δ Electorate less than half of the one observed in the corresponding *treated* unit.

[4]Further details on the use of subsampling methods as inferential tools for synthetic control estimators are presented in Saia (2017).

Figure A2: Democracy and Social Violence - Synthetic Control Method

(A) Treat. Var.: Δ *Electorate$_i$* (B) Treat. Var.: Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$*

NOTE - Left Panel: The solid line corresponds to the actual average incidence of social violence observed in all boroughs, while the dashed line captures the average incidence of violence obtained from synthetic counterfactuals. The dark grey area around the dashed line indicates the 99% confidence interval. Each synthetic unit was computed as a weighted average of randomly drawn group districts where the intensity of the enfranchisement due to the passage of the Reform was lower than in the district of interest. Weights are selected according to the incidence of conflict events of the unit in question prior to the elections of 1868. Right Panel: The solid line corresponds to the actual average incidence of social violence observed in all boroughs, while the dashed line captures the average incidence of violence obtained from synthetic counterfactuals. The dark grey area around the dashed line indicates the 99% confidence interval. Each synthetic unit was computed as a weighted average of randomly drawn group districts where the value of the variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* was lower than in the borough of interest. Weights are selected according to the incidence of conflict events of the unit in question prior to the elections of 1868.

Figure A3: Democracy and Social Violence - Synthetic Control Method - Placebo Elections

(A) Elections 1865 (B) Elections 1874

NOTE: Left [Right] Panel: The solid line corresponds to the actual average incidence of social violence observed in all boroughs, while the dashed line captures the average incidence of violence obtained from synthetic counterfactuals. The dark grey area around the dashed line indicates the 99% confidence interval. Each synthetic unit was computed as a weighted average of randomly drawn group districts where the intensity of the enfranchisement due to the passage of the Reform was lower than in the district of interest. Weights are selected according to the incidence of conflict events of the unit in question prior to the elections of 1865 [1874].

C.11 Alternative levels of clustering

As mentioned in the Section 7 of the main text, in the two Tables A13 and A14 below we show that the conclusions of the statistical inference continue to hold when we allow for standard errors to be clustered at alternative levels. In particular, Table A13 displays the results with several different clustering levels, among others for robust standard errors and for standard errors that are two-way clustered at the city and month level. Table A14 allows for spatial correlation in error terms using Conley (1999)'s approach and a range of different reference distances for spatial decay.

Table A13: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Levels of Clustering

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.104***	-0.100***	-0.101***				-0.143***	-0.145***	-0.144***
Cluster City	(0.0363)	(0.0380)	(0.0384)				(0.0474)	(0.0517)	(0.0513)
Cluster Robust	(0.0276)	(0.0291)	(0.0293)				(0.0372)	(0.0399)	(0.0397)
Double Cluster City-Month	(0.0364)	(0.0384)	(0.0388)				(0.0545)	(0.0592)	(0.0585)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.123***	-0.130***	-0.130***			
Cluster City				(0.0400)	(0.0447)	(0.0446)			
Cluster Robust				(0.0322)	(0.0357)	(0.0357)			
Double Cluster City-Month				(0.0464)	(0.0516)	(0.0513)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Standard error computed using clustered at clustered at alternative levels are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A14: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Levels of Spatial Clustering

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.104***	-0.100***	-0.101***				-0.143***	-0.145***	-0.144***
Cluster City	(0.0363)	(0.0380)	(0.0384)				(0.0474)	(0.0517)	(0.0513)
Spatial Cluster 25km	(0.0292)	(0.0308)	(0.0310)				(0.0379)	(0.0411)	(0.0409)
Spatial Cluster 50km	(0.0300)	(0.0317)	(0.0320)				(0.0396)	(0.0425)	(0.0421)
Spatial Cluster 100km	(0.0303)	(0.0325)	(0.0328)				(0.0393)	(0.0422)	(0.0418)
Spatial Cluster 150km	(0.0287)	(0.0316)	(0.0317)				(0.0395)	(0.0430)	(0.0426)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.123***	-0.130***	-0.130***			
Cluster City				(0.0400)	(0.0447)	(0.0446)			
Spatial Cluster 25km				(0.0330)	(0.0370)	(0.0370)			
Spatial Cluster 50km				(0.0348)	(0.0385)	(0.0385)			
Spatial Cluster 100km				(0.0344)	(0.0381)	(0.0380)			
Spatial Cluster 100km				(0.0343)	(0.0384)	(0.0384)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223	.223

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act). City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Standard error computed using clustered at clustered at alternative (spatial) levels are reported in parenthesis. Spatial standard errors are computed using the *acreg* command coded by Colella et al. (2019). Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.12 Outliers and sample composition

As discussed earlier in Section 7, we display below a series of robustness results when removing data from one city at a time, when discarding conflict-events from one newspaper at a time or when randomly eliminating days in our time-window.

Firstly, we replicate our baseline regressions when dropping one city at the time. Panels A and B in Figure A4 display the distribution of coefficients estimated using baseline regressions presented in columns 3 and 9 of Table 1, respectively. The corresponding point estimates are hardly affected when removing units from our sample and always reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Secondly, we explore whether our results hold if we drop one newspaper source at the time. Corresponding results are reported in Figure A5. It turns out that the results remain very similar and we still find a statistically significant conflict-reducing impact of franchise extension.

Finally, we assess whether our results are robust when only a subsample of days in our sample period are used. To this end we carry out a Monte Carlo analysis with 1,000 repetitions where for each draw only two-thirds of days are kept in our sample period. Panels A and B in Figure A6 display the distribution of coefficients estimated using the baseline specifications of columns 3 and 9 of Table 1, respectively. In both cases, point estimates of the coefficient of interest appear to be fairly stable to the sample removal exercises and are consistent with the baseline estimates reported in the main text.

Figure A4: Democracy and Social Violence - Dropping One City at the Time

(A) LPM Estimates   (B) 2SLS Estimates

NOTE: Panel A [Panel B] displays the distribution of coefficients estimated for the variable Δ *Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$* using the specification of column 3 [column 9] of Table 1 obtained by removing one city at the time from the sample. Red dots indicate the point estimate of the coefficient of interest. Grey bars depict confidence intervals [the lighter the bar, the higher is the confidence threshold (i.e., light grey indicates 99% C.I.))].

Figure A5: Democracy and Social Violence - Dropping One Newspaper at the Time

(A) LPM Estimates

(B) 2SLS Estimates

NOTE: Panel A [Panel B] displays the distribution of coefficients estimated for the variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* using the specification of column 3 [column 9] of Table 1 obtained by removing one city at the time from the sample. Red dots indicate the point estimate of the coefficient of interest. Grey bars depict confidence intervals [the lighter the bar, the higher is the confidence threshold (i.e., light grey indicates 99% C.I.))].

Figure A6: Distribution of coefficients estimated using 1,000 sample periods

(A) LPM Estimates

(B) 2SLS Estimates

NOTE: Panel A [Panel B] displays the distribution of 1,000 coefficients estimated for the variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* * *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* using the specification of column 3 [column 9] of Table 1 obtained by (randomly) removing one-third of days in our sample period. Red line indicates the point estimate of the coefficient of interest obtained with the full sample.

C.13 Alternative Periods

In the current Appendix Section we investigate robustness to constructing alternative time periods. In particular, in Table A15 below we display results when we add additional years in the post-election period. We prefer the baseline sample of the main text (1868-1869) in order to limit concerns related to the fact that different reforms were implemented in the years after 1869 – yet it is still useful to perform a robustness test revealing up to what extent the main results may carry over for a longer time period. It turns out that we still find a strong conflict-reducing effect of franchise extension even for a longer sample period.

Table A15: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative Time-Windows

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.143***	-0.144***	-0.147***	-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.162***	-0.153***	-0.166***	-0.152***	-0.166***	-0.158***	-0.173***
	(0.0474)	(0.0513)	(0.0421)	(0.0467)	(0.0420)	(0.0464)	(0.0421)	(0.0467)	(0.0429)	(0.0472)	(0.0433)	(0.0477)
Observations	4,416	4,416	6,624	6,624	8,832	8,832	11,040	11,040	13,248	13,248	15,456	15,456
1st stage F-Stat	232	186	232	186	232	186	232	186	232	186	232	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Time Periods	1868-1869		1868-1870		1868-1871		1868-1872		1868-1873		1868-1874	
Sample Mean	.223	.223	.212	.212	.203	.203	.204	.204	.199	.199	.199	.199

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. In columns 1-2 [3-4] (5-6) The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869 [1868-1870] (1868-1871). In columns 7-8 [9-10] (11-12) The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1872 [1868-1873] (1868-1874). 2SLS estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ +$ Number Householders Above 10£)/(Number Householders Above 10£))$_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.14 Leads and Lags

Related to the previous Appendix Section C.13, in what follows we study the evolution of effects over time, but this time by slicing the sample in four subperiods. Figure A7 displays the OLS and 2SLS coefficients over different time-windows. As expected, before the reform future enfranchisement does not matter, resulting in a zero coefficient (which is consistent with the common pre-trend assumption), but after the reform places with greater franchise extension suffered less from conflict. Interestingly, while the effect of franchise extension declines somewhat over time, it still remain of substantial size and statistically significant for the second post-reform period.

Figure A7: Democracy and Social Violence - Leads and Lags

(A) Expl. Var.: Δ *Electorate*$_i$ (B) Expl. Var.: Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$

NOTE: Panels A and B display the coefficients of estimates of leads and lags of the variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ and Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$, respectively obtained using our main sample and the specification used in columns 1 and 4 of Table 1, respectively. The dependent variable is *Social Violence*$_{it}$. Time-windows are displayed on the horizontal axis [omitted period is [T-6:T-1].

C.15 Alternative Time Frequencies

In order to investigate whether results hinge on the use of monthly time units, below we shall construct the dataset in two alternative ways, i) at the weekly level, and ii) with simply one pre- and one post-reform period. The results reported in A16 are the ones obtained using a weekly-level panel, while Table A17 depicts the findings for a two period (pre-post) panel. In both cases we still continue to find a strong and significant conflict-reducing impact of franchise extension.

Table A16: Democracy and Social Violence - Weekly-Level Panel

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{iw}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_w$	-0.0377** (0.0164)	-0.0390** (0.0166)	-0.0391** (0.0170)				-0.0451* (0.0229)	-0.0500** (0.0234)	-0.0499** (0.0230)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_w$				-0.0391** (0.0198)	-0.0448** (0.0208)	-0.0449** (0.0205)			
Observations	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136	19,136
R-squared	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280	0.280			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_w$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_w$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.092	.092	.092	.092	.092	.092	.092	.092	.092

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and week w. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month w. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_w$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A17: Democracy and Social Violence - Pre-Post Panel

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{iw}$	Avg. Months	Log Months	Log Events	Avg. Months	Log Months	Log Events	Avg. Months	Log Months	Log Events
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_T$	-0.101*** (0.0385)	-0.126 (0.138)	-0.565* (0.305)				-0.144*** (0.0515)	-0.279 (0.188)	-0.813** (0.395)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_T$				-0.130*** (0.0447)	-0.252 (0.165)	-0.732** (0.351)			
Observations	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368	368
R-squared	0.900	0.833	0.833	0.901	0.835	0.833	0.052	0.007	0.025
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	185	185	185
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Period FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_T$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_T$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.222	.957	1.454	.222	.957	1.454	.222	.957	1.454

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and period T, where T (T-1) represents the period before (after) the elections of 1868. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. In columns 1-4-7 [2-5-8] (3-6-9) dependent variable is the average number of months with social violence in city i and period T [the (log+1) number of months with violent events in city i and period T] (the (log+1) number of violent events in city i and period T). The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_T$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.16 Placebo IVs

One potential worry could be that our instrument "mechanically" picks up some measurement error or city characteristics unrelated to electoral reform. To investigate this possibility, we start by studying in Figure A8 whether our IV also predicts electorate changes outside large-scale reforms (which it should not, if our identification strategy is valid). Reassuringly, the change in eligible renters within the 4 to 10 pounds bracket does not correlate with the change in electors neither in the pre-reform period nor in the period after the reform – as assumed, it only explains the change in the electorate in 1868 when the Second Reform Act was implemented.

As a next step, we replicate the main analysis using the period around the election in 1865 [elections prior to the introduction of the Second Reform Act] and in 1874 [after the reform]. In other words, we investigate whether our instrumental variable had an effect during the elections of 65 and 74 (which, again, it should not, if our identification strategy is valid). In Figure A9 we display the reduced-form coefficients obtained using the elections of 1865 [11–24 July 1865], 1868 and 1874 [31 January – 17 February 1874]. That is, we take time-windows across different elections and compare the effect of our instrument on social violence in the post-election periods for these various elections. Reassuringly, the displayed coefficients are statistically significant only in the election of 1868.

Figure A8: Δ Electors and Δ Eligible Householders

(A) Pre-Reform [1857-1832]

(B) Pre-Reform [1860-1857]

(C) Pre-Reform [1866-1860]

(D) Post-Reform [1873-1869]

NOTE: Panel A displays the values of Δ Electorate between 1832 and 1857 and Δ eligible householders in 1866 in English boroughs along two axes. Panel B displays the values of Δ Electorate between 1857 and 1860 and Δ eligible householders in 1866 in English boroughs along two axes. Panel C displays the values of Δ Electorate between 1860 and 1866 and Δ eligible householders in 1866 in English boroughs along two axes. Panel D displays the values of Δ Electorate between 1869 and 1873 and Δ eligible householders in 1866 in English boroughs along two axes.

Figure A9: Democracy and Social Violence - ITT Estimates using Alternative Elections

(A) Elections 1865

(B) Elections 1868

(C) Elections 1874

NOTE: The first and second column of Panel B display the coefficients of the variable Δ *Householders Below Threshold$_i$* * *Post-Election 1868$_t$* obtained using our main sample reported in columns 3 and 5 of Table 1, respectively. Panels A and C displays the results obtained using the period around the elections of 1865 [elections prior to the introduction of the Second Reform Act] and in 1874 [after the reform].

C.17 Placebo Events (Sports)

In this Appendix Section, we perform a further placebo exercise. Rather than using text algorithms to detect episodes of social violence, we apply the same tools to identify sport events. In other words, we use the sport-related variable to investigate whether the electoral reform affected sport events. The idea is that if the pattern found using sport-events is similar to the one obtained with conflict-episodes, then we should be worried that the results displayed in Table 1 could be due to something else (for example, newspaper coverage or some hidden pattern in the data construction).

The results obtained using sport-related events in a city (at the extensive margin) as dependent variable are displayed in Table A18. Corresponding estimates suggest no effect of the reform on sport events – which provides support to our empirical design.

Table A18: Placebo Analysis - Democracy and Sport Events

Dep. Variable: Sport Events $_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	0.0215	0.0128	0.0149				0.0174	-0.00271	-0.00393
	(0.0312)	(0.0335)	(0.0337)				(0.0410)	(0.0462)	(0.0459)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				0.0151	-0.00243	-0.00354			
				(0.0356)	(0.0414)	(0.0413)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.384	0.384	0.385	0.384	0.384	0.385			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Week FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.337	.337	.337	.337	.337	.337	.337	.337	.337

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a sport event was observed in city i and month t. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.18   Placebo Samples

As discussed in Section 7 of the main text, to investigate concerns about our main findings having been obtained "by chance", we carry out a further placebo exercise where we randomly assign treatment in 1,000 placebo datasets with the same average conflict likelihood as the "true" data (i.e. our main conflict dataset built based on newspapers articles). Figure A10 below depicts the clouds of estimated coefficients of our baseline specifications (Columns 3 and 9 of baseline Table 1) with this "fake" data. Panel A displays all coefficients obtained from all 1,000 placebo samples. Each dot corresponds to one combination of coefficients in a cartesian plane where the horizontal axis represents the OLS coefficient of the specification of Column 3, while the vertical axis depicts the 2SLS coefficient of the specification of Column 9. The large black dot represents our true coefficients. We can see that the cloud of placebo coefficients is centered around zero and it is extremely unlikely that the estimated coefficients of the baseline regressions could have been obtained "by chance".

In the same spirit, Panel B shows the estimates when the coefficients obtained with the two specifications (and the same placebo dataset) are both statistically significant at the 1 % level: This applies to only 2 placebo datasets (out of 1,000). These results highlight how extremely unlikely it would have been to obtain our results "by chance".

Figure A10: Results of Placebo Exercise

A) All estimated coefficients   C) Both coefficients stat. sign. at the 1 % level

NOTE - Each panel displays all coefficients obtained using 1,000 placebo conflict datasets with the same average conflict likelihood as our main conflict dataset built based on newspapers articles. Each dot corresponds to one combination of coefficients in a cartesian plane where the horizontal axis represents the beta coefficient of the OLS specification of Column 3, while the vertical axis depicts the beta coefficient of the 2SLS specification of Column 9 of baseline Table 1. The large black dot represents our true coefficients. Panel A displays all coefficients. Panel B shows the estimates when the coefficients obtained with the two specifications (and the same placebo dataset) are both statistically significant at the 1 % level. The number of placebo datasets displayed in each cartesian plan is reported in the bottom-right corner.

C.19 Placebo Rent Structure

As mentioned in Section 7, to investigate concerns about the validity of our instrument, below we carry out another placebo exercise where we randomly assign the structure of rents paid by households in 1,000 placebo datasets with the distribution featuring the same average and standard deviation as the "true" data. Figure A11 below depicts the distribution of estimated first-stage coefficients with this "fake" rent data. In Panel A [Panel B], each dot corresponds to one combination of results in a cartesian plane where the horizontal axis represents our first-stage beta coefficient, while the vertical axis depicts the corresponding p-value [r-squared value]. In both panels, the results obtained with "true" rents distribution (represented by the large black dot) stick out from the cloud of results obtained with "fake" data. These findings highlight how unlikely it would have been to obtain similar first-stage results "by chance".

Figure A11: Placebo Δ Eligible Householders and Δ Electors

(A) $1st\ Stage\ \beta$ and $p-values$ (B) $1st\ Stage\ \beta$ and R^2

NOTE: Each panel displays all estimates obtained using 1,000 placebo datasets with the same average Δ *Householders Below Threshold* as the observed distribution. Each dot in Panel A [Panel B] corresponds to one combination of results in a cartesian plane where the horizontal axis represents our first-stage beta coefficient, while the vertical axis depicts the corresponding p-value [r-squared value]. The large dots display the results obtained with true values of Δ *Householders Below Threshold* observed in our data.

C.20 Alternative Data Construction Methods

In what follows we shall investigate the robustness of our findings with respect to technical details of our conflict variable construction. The baseline results were obtained by extracting cities in the string [-25:+50] nearby conflict related words. In the current Appendix Section we explore whether our results hold when we adopt different string bandwidths. As shown in Tables A19 to A21, the baseline findings are not sensitive to the string bandwidths used.

Table A19: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative String Bandwidths [1]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0982*** (0.0359)	-0.105*** (0.0379)	-0.106*** (0.0383)				-0.104** (0.0461)	-0.119** (0.0502)	-0.119** (0.0498)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.0899** (0.0399)	-0.107** (0.0444)	-0.107** (0.0443)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.365	0.365	0.365	0.364	0.364	0.364			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.187	.187	.187	.187	.187	.187	.187	.187	.187

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.20 by extracting cities in the string [0:+50] nearby conflict related words. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A20: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative String Bandwidths [2]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0917** (0.0367)	-0.0931** (0.0388)	-0.0937** (0.0394)				-0.122*** (0.0457)	-0.134*** (0.0493)	-0.133*** (0.0488)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.106*** (0.0388)	-0.120*** (0.0428)	-0.120*** (0.0426)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.381	0.381	0.381	0.381	0.381	0.381			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.286	.286	.286	.286	.286	.286	.286	.286	.286

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.20 by extracting cities in the string [-50:+50] nearby conflict related words. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Democracy and Social Violence - Alternative String Bandwidths [3]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0971**	-0.0874**	-0.0884**				-0.126**	-0.113**	-0.113**
	(0.0378)	(0.0403)	(0.0407)				(0.0500)	(0.0564)	(0.0559)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.110**	-0.102**	-0.102**			
				(0.0422)	(0.0495)	(0.0494)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.369	0.370	0.370			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.282	.282	.282	.282	.282	.282	.282	.282	.282

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.20 by extracting cities in the string [-25:+75] nearby conflict related words. The variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.21 Conflict-related Keywords

An important parameter for the construction of the conflict data is the set of keywords used, as discussed in Section 4. In Table A22 below are listed the baseline set of terms used to identify conflict-related sentences. In the current Appendix Section we assess whether our results are robust when only a subsample of these keywords are used. We first replicate our baseline results when removing from the variable construction all *disturbance*-related keywords (i.e., disturbance, disturbances). Corresponding results are displayed in Table A23. We find in all specifications a strong and statistically significant impact of the explanatory variable on reducing conflict.

Similar results are obtained when we remove conflict events identified with the keyword *unrest* (Table A24), *riot*-related keywords (Table A25), *disorder*-related keywords (Table A26) and *tumult*-related keywords (Table A27). In all cases, the baseline results prove robust to modifying the set of keywords included.

Table A22: List of Conflict-related Keywords

Disturbance, Disturbances
Unrest
Riot, Riots, Rioters, Rioting
Tumult, Tumults
Disorder, Disorders

Table A23: Democracy and Social Violence - Exclude *Disturbance*-related Events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0845**	-0.0774**	-0.0796**				-0.135***	-0.134***	-0.133***
	(0.0358)	(0.0378)	(0.0382)				(0.0442)	(0.0486)	(0.0478)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.117***	-0.120***	-0.120***			
				(0.0366)	(0.0414)	(0.0410)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.357	0.357	0.357	0.358	0.358	0.358			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.167	.167	.167	.167	.167	.167	.167	.167	.167

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1 using the following keywords: Unrest, Riot, Riots, Rioters, Rioting, Tumult, Tumults, Disorder, Disorders. The variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A24: Democracy and Social Violence - Exclude *Unrest*-related Events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0986***	-0.0975**	-0.0982**				-0.132***	-0.139***	-0.139***
	(0.0362)	(0.0379)	(0.0384)				(0.0466)	(0.0507)	(0.0503)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.114***	-0.125***	-0.125***			
				(0.0396)	(0.0440)	(0.0438)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.367	0.367	0.367	0.367	0.367	0.367			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.222	.222	.222	.222	.222	.222	.222	.222	.222

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1 using the following keywords: Disturbance, Disturbances, Riot, Riots, Rioters, Rioting, Tumult, Tumults, Disorder, Disorders. The variable Δ $Electorate_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ $Eligible\ Householders_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A25: Democracy and Social Violence - Exclude *Riot*-related Events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0668***	-0.0762***	-0.0761***				-0.0664*	-0.0870**	-0.0871**
	(0.0253)	(0.0266)	(0.0268)				(0.0400)	(0.0411)	(0.0408)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.0575	-0.0780**	-0.0784**			
				(0.0349)	(0.0368)	(0.0367)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.321	0.321	0.321	0.320	0.320	0.321			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.141	.141	.141	.141	.141	.141	.141	.141	.141

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1 using the following keywords: Disturbance, Disturbances, Unrest, Tumult, Tumults, Disorder, Disorders. The variable Δ $Electorate_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ $Eligible\ Householders_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A26: Democracy and Social Violence - Exclude *Disorder*-related Events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.106***	-0.100***	-0.100**				-0.131***	-0.127**	-0.127**
	(0.0367)	(0.0384)	(0.0389)				(0.0480)	(0.0522)	(0.0518)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.114***	-0.114**	-0.114**			
				(0.0408)	(0.0456)	(0.0456)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.368	0.368	0.368	0.368	0.368	0.368			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.217	.217	.217	.217	.217	.217	.217	.217	.217

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1 using the following keywords: Disturbance, Disturbances, Unrest, Riot, Riots, Rioters, Rioting, Tumult, Tumults. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A27: Democracy and Social Violence - Exclude *Tumult*-related Events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.105***	-0.102***	-0.102***				-0.143***	-0.147***	-0.147***
	(0.0356)	(0.0372)	(0.0377)				(0.0464)	(0.0506)	(0.0502)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.124***	-0.132***	-0.132***			
				(0.0392)	(0.0436)	(0.0436)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370	0.370			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.219	.219	.219	.219	.219	.219	.219	.219	.219

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1 using the following keywords: Disturbance, Disturbances, Unrest, Riot, Riots, Rioters, Rioting, Disorder, Disorders. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.22 Building the Conflict Variable Using a Machine Learning (Lasso) Approach

As mentioned in Section 7, our main conflict variable is constructed using a bag-of-words method. This has the virtue of simplicity and transparency, but may be somewhat sensitive to the keywords used. While in the previous Appendix Section we have already performed a first robustness check with that respect, in the current Appendix Section we shall go one step further and completely re-create from scratch an alternative conflict measure that relies on a very different approach.

In particular, in what follows we make use of machine learning (i.e. a lasso model) to build our conflict measure. We start with 1,000 sentences on violent events identified by our baseline bag-of-words algorithm. Then we check manually each entry and code whether it indeed refers to a violent event in the corresponding city or whether it is a "false positive". Out of 1,000 sentences, around 85 % of our strings are related to true violent events. We use 900 strings to train an algorithm (i.e. cross-repetition lasso using keyword in the string as explanatory variables) that predicts if the sentence is related to a true conflict or not. With our algorithm we are able to reach a goodness of prediction of 93% in 100 out-of-sample articles. In particular, we train the lasso model on 900 articles, and using the trained model, we are able to identify correctly [i.e., string with event or string without event] 93 out of 100 out-of-sample strings that were not included in the training.[5]

We then apply our algorithm to the full set of strings and we only keep the ones identified by the algorithm as conflict-related to construct the corresponding dependent variable. Note that the sample mean of conflict events obtained using this alternative approach is very similar to our baseline. This is due to the fact that our dependent variable of interest is a dummy (e.g., if there are two strings in a month coded as conflict-related by the original algorithm, the probability of having no true event is only of 2.25%).

Using this alternative lasso-based conflict measure, we estimate a series of robustness specifications (Tables A28 to A30). In all cases we find very similar results as for our baseline estimates.

We also explore whether errors (i.e., when lasso events are equal to 0 and original events are equal to 1) are correlated with our identifying source of variation (i.e., whether errors are more likely in places that enfranchise more under the reform) but this does not appear to be the case, as shown in Table A31. In this table, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if there is at least one conflict event in the city using all strings identified by the baseline bag-of-words approach, but

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[5]We also explored whether using a larger string increases the accuracy of the prediction. It turns out that goodness of prediction is not affected by the length of the string (i.e., short strings contain enough information to detect social violence events). In this second exercise we use strings with average length of 368 (median 400) [around 4 times larger than the *baseline* string]. Using this second set of data, out-of-sample accuracy is similar (94%).

no events found in the city when applying the lasso method. We can see that this measure of "false positives" is unrelated to our key political explanatory variables of interest. These results are consistent with the notion that measurement error may be of a "classical" type, leading –if anything– to attenuation bias.

Table A28: Democracy and Social Violence - Using Results from Lasso-exercise [1]

Dep. Variable: Social Violence $[LASSO]_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.101***	-0.0980**	-0.0989**				-0.136***	-0.141***	-0.140***
	(0.0364)	(0.0380)	(0.0385)				(0.0475)	(0.0515)	(0.0510)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.118***	-0.126***	-0.126***			
				(0.0402)	(0.0445)	(0.0444)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.352	0.352	0.352	0.353	0.353	0.353			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.216	.216	.216	.216	.216	.216	.216	.216	.216

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.22. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A29: Democracy and Social Violence - Using Results from Lasso-exercise [2]

Dep. Variable: (log) Social Violence $[LASSO]_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.218***	-0.234***	-0.238***				-0.258**	-0.303**	-0.300**
	(0.0829)	(0.0859)	(0.0888)				(0.116)	(0.127)	(0.124)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.224**	-0.271**	-0.270**			
				(0.100)	(0.113)	(0.111)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.449	0.449	0.449	0.448	0.448	0.448			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.291	.291	.291	.291	.291	.291	.291	.291	.291

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is the (log+1) number of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.22. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A30: Democracy and Social Violence - Using Results from Lasso-exercise [3]

Dep. IHS Social Violence [LASSO]$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.261***	-0.279***	-0.283***				-0.308**	-0.360**	-0.357**
	(0.0978)	(0.101)	(0.105)				(0.135)	(0.148)	(0.145)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.267**	-0.322**	-0.321**			
				(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.129)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.455	0.455	0.455	0.454	0.455	0.455			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.365	.365	.365	.365	.365	.365	.365	.365	.365

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of violent events observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.22. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A31: Difference between Lasso-events and Baseline-events

Dep. IHS Social Violence [LASSO]$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.00391	-0.00242	-0.00214				-0.00613	-0.00351	-0.00369
	(0.00316)	(0.00318)	(0.00318)				(0.00428)	(0.00411)	(0.00411)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				-0.00532	-0.00315	-0.00332			
				(0.00368)	(0.00367)	(0.00369)			
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.738	0.738	0.738	0.738	0.738	0.738			
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	-	-	232	195	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.007	.007	.007	.007	.007	.007	.007	.007	.007

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if there is at least one conflict event in the city i and month t using all strings identified by the baseline bag-of-words approach, but no events found in the city when applying the lasso method. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section C.22. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D Appendix: Channels

D.1 Increase in State Capacity

In this Appendix Section we display several robustness checks for our analysis of channels presented in Section 8 of the main text. In particular, in Appendix Table A32 we replicate Table 2 from the main text, but using a Poisson model instead of OLS. Further, the following Appendix Table A33 performs a similar analysis as in Table 3 but focusing on public deficits instead of public spending as proxy for increased state capacity building. Both Appendix Tables A32 and A33 support the aforementioned conclusion that we are unable to detect as channel of transmission a change in (proxies of) state capacity.

Table A32: Channels - Democracy and State Capacity - Political Speeches

Dep. Variable: City Mentions in Political Speeches$_{iv}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	-0.139	-0.246	-0.217			
	(0.172)	(0.268)	(0.264)			
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$				-0.0779	-0.183	-0.167
				(0.165)	(0.262)	(0.264)
Observations	1,424	1,424	1,424	1,424	1,424	1,424
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_v$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	8.334	8.334	8.334	8.334	8.334	8.334

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and time v. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. Poisson estimates are reported in columns 1-6. The dependent variable is the number of mentions of city i and time/volume v. It was obtained using the Hansard Archive of Digitized Debates that contains digitized plain-text transcriptions of all debates for the House of Commons and House of Lords. Hansard data is available in volumes that cover a period of around three months. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy Post-Elections 1868$_v$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A33: Channels - Democracy and State Capacity - Deficit

Dep. Variable: Public Deficit$_{i,1869}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$	-690.5	-2,924	-668.3	-1,709	-5,934	-1,656
	(2,426)	(2,854)	(2,883)	(2,699)	(4,439)	(3,639)
Observations	141	136	136	141	136	136
R-squared	0.000	0.349	0.360	-0.000	0.346	0.360
1st stage F-Stat Delta Electors	-	-	-	130	128	131
(log) Public Expenditure$_{i,1868}$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i in year 1869. The full sample covers 141 cities. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-3 [4-6]. The dependent variable is the public deficit in the city i in 1869 (Knatchbull-Hugessen (1870)), computed as difference between expenditure and revenues in the city i. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The instrumental variable used in columns 4-6 is Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.2 Increased Participation in the Political Arena

In this Appendix section we display further results on the impact of enfranchisement on overall political participation and competitiveness. We start by investigating the impact of franchise extension on the voter turnout. To study this, we run the following regression:

$$\Delta\,Turnout_{1868-1865,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\Delta\,Electors_{1868-1865,i} + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3}$$

Table A34: Channels - Democracy and Δ Turnout

Dep. Variable: Δ Turnout$_i$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$	0.102	0.0425			0.226	0.180
	(0.105)	(0.0722)			(0.194)	(0.178)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$			0.157	0.126		
			(0.134)	(0.123)		
Observations	108	108	108	108	108	108
R-squared	0.011	0.046	0.026	0.057	-0.005	0.030
1st stage F-Stat Delta Electors	-	-	-	-	87	57
Average Rents$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-4 [5-6]. The dependent variable is the Δ Turnout$_i$ computed as $log((Turnout\,Elections - 1868)/(Turnout\,Elections - 1865))_i$ where $(Turnout\,Elections - 1868)_i$ and $(Turnout\,Elections - 1865)_i$ correspond to the ratio of voters over total electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The instrumental variable used in columns 5-6 is Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\,Householders\,4 - 10£ + Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£)/(Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£))_i$, where $(Number\,Householders\,4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. Average gross estimated rents and Gini index of rents, both computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In the following Table A35 we study the same relationship but allowing for a more flexible specification. The dependent variable is now the *level* of turnout in 1869, while controlling in some specifications for past turnout. Taken together, the Tables A34 and A35 are imprecisely estimated: The coefficient of the explanatory variable of interest (change in electorate) is always positive but in most columns not statistically significant.

Table A35: Channels - Democracy and Turnout

Dep. Variable: $Turnout_{i,1868}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ $Electorate_i$	0.0593**	0.0312	0.0346	0.0949**	0.0526	0.0898
	(0.0280)	(0.0264)	(0.0323)	(0.0453)	(0.0502)	(0.0652)
Observations	153	153	108	153	153	108
R-squared	0.017	0.056	0.123	0.011	0.054	0.105
1st stage F-Stat Delta Electors	-	-	-	182	143	55
Average $Rents_i$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent $Inequality_i$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
$Turnout_{i,1865}$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-3 [4-6]. The dependent variable is the $Turnout_{i,1868}$ and correspond to the ratio of voters over total electorate after the Second Reform Act in a city i. The instrumental variable used in columns 4-6 is Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 $\pounds$ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 $\pounds$ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. Average gross estimated rents and Gini index of rents, both computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.3 Increase in Economic Activity

Finally, in Appendix Table A36 we replicate Table 5, but relying on Poisson estimations instead of OLS, which yields very similar results.

Table A36: Channels - Democracy and Economic Growth - Newspapers Ads

Dep. Variable: City Mentions in Newspaper Ads$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	0.135***	0.142**	0.139**			
	(0.0385)	(0.0564)	(0.0555)			
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$				0.146***	0.190***	0.179***
				(0.0364)	(0.0534)	(0.0525)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Sample Mean	102.494	102.494	102.494	102.494	102.494	102.494

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. Poisson estimates are reported in columns 1-6. The dependent variable is the number of mentions of city i in pages of job advertisements in month t using national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\,Post-Reform)/(Electors\,Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\,Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\,Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\,Householders\,4-10£ + Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£)/(Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£))_i$, where $(Number\,Householders\,4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\,Householders\,Above\,10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.4 Heterogeneous Effects – Market Potential

In this Appendix section we provide further information and display the tables of the heterogeneous effects analysis, summarized in the main text in Section 8.4. We start with the analysis of market potential as magnifying factor of the economic dividend of the Second Reform Act. In particular, for each city, we compute a simple market-potential index (Harris (1954)) which captures how close a given city is to large markets with many potential consumers:

$$Market\ Potential_i = \sum_{\forall j \neq i} \frac{Population_j}{Distance_{ij}} \tag{4}$$

where $Population_j$ indicates the population of city j in year 1866, $Distance_{ij}$ represent the distance between city i and city j.

Below we explore whether the effects of enfranchisement are magnified by greater market opportunities of a city. Corresponding estimates are displayed in Tables A37 and A38. In line with the evidence presented in Section 8.3, we conclude that both the overall pacifying effect as well as the pro-growth impact of the Second Reform Act are magnified for towns in regions with larger marker potential.

Table A37: Democracy and Social Violence - Heterogeneous Effect - Market Potential

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0988***	-0.0680**		
	(0.0325)	(0.0325)		
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	-0.0911***	-0.191***		
	(0.0313)	(0.0703)		
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			-0.110***	-0.0768**
			(0.0370)	(0.0385)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$			-0.0928**	-0.181**
			(0.0408)	(0.0746)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.372	0.373	0.372	0.373
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. The variable *Market Potential$_i$* is computed following the approach described in Section D.4. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A38: Democracy and Economic Growth - Heterogeneous Effect - Market Potential

Dep. Variable: (log) City Mentions in Newspaper Ads$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	0.154**	0.159**		
	(0.0662)	(0.0684)		
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	0.155***	0.275*		
	(0.0583)	(0.154)		
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			0.170**	0.162**
			(0.0683)	(0.0821)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$			0.191***	0.373***
			(0.0728)	(0.138)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.935	0.936	0.935	0.937
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * (log) Market Potential$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. OLS (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-6 [7-9]. The dependent variable is (log+1) of number of mentions of city i in pages of job advertisements in month t using national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. The variable *Market Potential$_i$* is computed following the approach described in Section D.4. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.5 Heterogeneous Effects – Ethnic Polarization

Another key dimension of potential heterogeneity is the local population composition, as during the 1860s there were substantial social tensions between the Anglican Englishmen and Catholic immigrant laborers from Ireland. The so-called "Murphy riots" (see Arnstein (1975)) were a manifestation of these tensions. Hence, we expect that the pacifying effect of the enfranchisement of part of the working class may be larger in areas with greater social tensions. In previous work it has been found that ethnically polarized societies are on average more likely to be plagued by inter-group conflict (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban et al. (2012)). To investigate whether indeed ethnic polarization magnifies our enfranchisement effects, we compute, for each city, the level of ethnic polarization, following the approach of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), and distinguishing between two groups: 1) Individuals born in England or Wales; 2) Irish born individuals. As shown in Table A39 below, in areas with higher ethnic polarization political reform has –as expected– a greater pacifying potential.

Table A39: Democracy and Social Violence - Heterogeneous Effect - Polarization Irish vs English/Welsh

Dep. Variable: Social Violence$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0794**	-0.0595		
	(0.0359)	(0.0391)		
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * Polarization$_i$	-0.795**	-2.478***		
	(0.312)	(0.800)		
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			-0.0928**	-0.0823*
			(0.0405)	(0.0472)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * Polarization$_i$			-0.982**	-3.124***
			(0.420)	(1.142)
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.371	0.372	0.371	0.372
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * Polarization$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ * Polarization$_i$	No	Yes	No	Yes

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM estimates are reported in all columns. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Section 4.1. The variable Δ *Electorate$_i$* is computed as $log((Electors\ Post-Reform)/(Electors\ Pre-Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post-Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre-Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders$_i$* is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4-10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. The variable *Polarization$_i$* indicates the polarization index in city i computed using two groups: Irish-born inhabitants and England and Wales-born inhabitants (data from the 1861 Census (IPUMS (2020))). City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

D.6 Heterogeneous Effects – Types of Social Violence

In this Appendix Section we investigate what types of social violence are affected by the enfranchisement of the Second Reform Act. The historical literature on the "Age of Reforms" in Victorian England (see Section 3) highlights that some social tensions during the 1860s were linked to claims for political inclusion (think e.g. of some of the "Reform League" demonstrations), while some riots were linked to ethno-religious competition and conflict (think e.g. of the "Murphy Riots"). One may expect franchise extension to reduce (almost mechanically) the unrest linked to claims for participation and enfranchisement (as many requests have been satisfied by the Second Reform Act). At the same time, the enfranchisement gave a political voice to the urban working class, a part of it being from Irish origin, which similarly could have reduced social tensions by fostering political inclusion of all major ethnic groups (see e.g. Mueller and Rohner (2018)). Hence, we expect both a reduction in *political* and *ethno-religious* types of conflict.

Further, to the extent that enfranchisement boosted the economy (see Section 8.3), one may expect a higher opportunity cost of engaging in social unrest in booming cities. This could attenuate the risk of all kinds of conflict, not only the aforementioned political and ethno-religious ones, but also others, such as *economic* types of social conflict.

While it is difficult to pin-down the exact type of conflict for a given incident, below we carry out an explorative, keyword-based exercise going in this direction. In particular, the presence of the following keywords (nearby the text string related to conflict) will classify a given incident into the three aforementioned categories of conflict types:

- Political: representation, suffrage, franchise, voters, democracy

- Religious: protestant, church, papal, chapel, priest, catholic, clergy, murphy, religion, religious

- Economic: strike, workers, salaries, unemployed, workmen, labourers, unemployed, iron-workers, workpeople, labour, trade unions

As a next step we run the baseline specification of the benchmark Table 1, but with as dependent variable the three measures of specific types of social violence. The results are displayed in Tables A40, A41 and A42, respectively. We find that all these three types of social violence tend to be reduced by enfranchisement.

Table A40: Democracy and Social Violence - Politics-related events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence $[Political]_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0107	-0.0173**			-0.00920	-0.0227*
	(0.00810)	(0.00814)			(0.0115)	(0.0116)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			-0.00797	-0.0204*		
			(0.00998)	(0.0104)		
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.094	0.096	0.094	0.096		
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	232	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ 68	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.009	.009	.009	.009	.009	.009

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-4 [5-6]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a politics-related violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Sections 4.1 and D.6. The variable Δ Electorate$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868$_t$* takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10 \pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A41: Democracy and Social Violence - Ethno-Religious-related events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence [Religious]$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0678***	-0.0693***			-0.0843**	-0.0879**
	(0.0243)	(0.0258)			(0.0330)	(0.0345)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			-0.0731**	-0.0792**		
			(0.0287)	(0.0310)		
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.306	0.306	0.305	0.305		
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	232	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ 68	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06	.06

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-4 [5-6]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a religious-related violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Sections 4.1 and D.6. The variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10\pounds)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10\pounds)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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Table A42: Democracy and Social Violence - Economic-related events

Dep. Variable: Social Violence [Economic]$_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ Electorate$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	-0.0318*	-0.0442***			-0.0274	-0.0523**
	(0.0163)	(0.0154)			(0.0244)	(0.0235)
Δ Eligible Householders$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$			-0.0238	-0.0471**		
			(0.0211)	(0.0209)		
Observations	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416	4,416
R-squared	0.154	0.156	0.153	0.155		
1st stage F-Stat	-	-	-	-	232	186
City FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Average Rents$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$ 68	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Rent Inequality$_i$ * Post-Elections 1868$_t$	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Mean	.026	.026	.026	.026	.026	.026

NOTE: The unit of observation is a city i and month t. The sample covers 184 cities over the period 1868-1869. LPM (2SLS) estimates are reported in columns 1-4 [5-6]. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if a economic-related violent event was observed in city i and month t. The social violence data was constructed using 471 national or local newspapers available on the *British Newspaper Archive*, following the approach described in Sections 4.1 and D.6. The variable Δ *Electorate*$_i$ is computed as $log((Electors\ Post - Reform)/(Electors\ Pre - Reform))_i$ where $(Electors\ Post - Reform)_i$ and $(Electors\ Pre - Reform)_i$ correspond to the electorate pre and after the Second Reform Act in a city i, respectively. The dummy *Post-Elections 1868*$_t$ takes a value of 1 in the period post-November 1868. The variable Δ *Eligible Householders*$_i$ is computed as $log((Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£ + Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)/(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£))_i$, where $(Number\ Householders\ 4 - 10£)_i$ and $(Number\ Householders\ Above\ 10£)_i$ correspond to the number of householders living in a house with rental value between 4 and 10 £ (who were previously were banned from voting but enfranchised in the Second Reform Act) and the number of householders with rental value above 10 £ (who could already vote before the reform) in a city i, respectively. City-level rent-based variables have been computed using data from House of Commons (1866). Robust standard error clustered at the city level are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is represented by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Appendix: Supplementary data – Lists of newspapers used

The current Appendix Section is devoted to supplementary data. In particular, Table A43 displays all 471 national or local newspapers used to construct our novel conflict data. The total number of articles containing at least one conflict-related keyword available during our sample period is reported in parenthesis.

Table A43: Lists of newspapers used